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LATIN AMERICA AND ICSID:
DAVID VERSUS GOLIATH?
Katia Fach G6mez'
"Stranger and more pure than any hron is, at times, the ur:
the object produced through suggestion, educed by hope".
Tldn, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius Ficciones
Jorge Luis Borges
I. INTRODUCTIONIN recent years, the International Center for the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes (ICSID) has witnessed a dramatic increase in the
number of arbitration requests where Latin American countries are
the respondents. 2 Today, out of almost 130 cases pending, over sixty in-
volve states from the Latin American region.3 This situation is paradig-
matic, because Latin American countries initially showed a widespread
rejection of the ICSID Convention. In the mid-sixties Latin America
manifested its opposition, in bloc, to the World Bank's project to create
an international agency specializing in settling investment disputes.4 This
opposition was christened "El No de Tokyo."5 The Calvo Doctrine,
named after Carlos Calvo, an Argentine jurist, was firmly established at
1. This article was completed in July 2010, and all sources, including websites, are
current to that date. The author is Professor of Private International Law at the
University of Zaragoza (Spain), is a member of the Spanish Research Projects
DER2009-11 702 (Sub JURI) and e-PROCIFIS (Ref S14 / 3), and can be reached
at the following email address: katiafachgomez@gmail.com. Professor Fach
G6mez is grateful to Joseph T. McLaughlin for his suggestions, and would like to
express her appreciation and admiration for Alejandro Garro, who always offers
his abundant support and wisdom.
2. ICSID CASELOAD STATISTICS, INT'L CTR. FOR SEITLEMENT OF INv. DisUrEs 7
(2010), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=
Englishl2.
3. List of Pending Cases, Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, http://icsid.
worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=
ListPending (last visited Sept. 18, 2010).
4. See ANDREAS F. LOwENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAw 540 (John H.
Jackson ed., 2d ed., 2008); see also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The ICSID Convention:
Origins and Transformation, 38 GA. J. INTI'L & CoMu. L. 47, 54 (2009).
5. As Professor Lowenfeld reports: "[w]hen the report of the regional meetings on
the proposed convention came before the Board of Governors of the World Bank
(i.e. the full membership) at the Annual Meeting of the Bank in Tokyo in 1964, all
Latin American States voted 'no'-the first time in the Bank's history that a final
resolution had met with substantial opposition on a final vote." Lowenfeld, supra
note 4, at 54.
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the time, impeding foreign nationals from invoking the diplomatic protec-
tion to settle international disputes with Latin American states.6 This
doctrine, presented in the second half of the nineteenth century, is two-
fold: (1) sovereign states should not suffer from interference by other
states and (2) foreigners are placed on an equal footing with nationals;
thus, they can only seek redress for grievances before local courts.7 Ap-
plying this doctrine to the arbitration sphere means that international ar-
bitration is precluded in favor of the forum's jurisdiction.8 These theories
were incorporated, under the form of "Calvo Clause requirements," by
several Latin American States in their constitutions, statutes and interna-
tional contractual practices.9
The eighties introduced a shift on the issue. Some Latin American
countries privatized several of their energy and utility companies and at
the same time began to sign bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in order
to stimulate economic growth through direct investment.10 BITs typically
offer investors a group of substantive rights (e.g., fair and equitable treat-
ment to foreign investments, duty on host states to grant national and
most-favored-nation treatment and a series of guarantees in case of ex-
propriation).'1 BITs also include provisions for dealing with disputes be-
tween a state and investors from another state.12 Some of these treaties
allow private investors to resort to international arbitration, after ex-
hausting efforts to comply with domestic judicial proceedings during a
specific period of time.13 This prerequisite is known as the "soft Calvo
Clause."' 4 Other treaties allow direct access to arbitration.' 5 Almost al-
ways, BITs offer a menu of international arbitral forums where ICSID is
one of the options. 16
6. Francesco Tamburini, Historia y Destino de la Doctrina Calvo: Actualidad u Ob-
solescencia del Pensamiento de Carlos Calvo? [History and Fate of the Calvo Doc-
trine: Obsoleteness of the Current Thinking of Carlos Calvo], 24 Revista de
estudios hist6rico-juridicos (2002) (Chile), available at http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.
php?pid=s0716-54552002002400005&script=sciarttext.
7. Denise Manning-Cabrol, The Imminent Death of the Calvo Clause and the Re-
birth of the Calvo Principle: Equality of Foreign and National Investors, 26 LAw
& Pot'Y Ir'L Bus. 1169, 1172-73 (1995).
8. Bernardo M. Cremades, Disputes Arising out of Foreign Direct Investment in Latin
America: A New Look at the Calvo Doctrine and Other Jurisdictional Issues, 59
Disp. RiEsoL. J. 78, 80 (2004).
9. Id.
10. Manning-Cabrol, supra note 7, at 1191.




13. Cremades, supra note 8, at 81.
14. H-EcroiR A. MAIRAL, EL SILENCIO Di LOS TRIBULANEs ARGENTINOS [The Silence
of Argentinian Courts) 7, 19 (2007), available at http://www.iilj.org/GAUdocu-
ments/mairal.pdf.
15. Cremades, supra note 8, at 81.




In the last decade, the financial crisis in Argentina and several nation-
alizations carried out by young leftist and populist governments in South
America has spawned a large number of claims before ICSID, brought
primarily by U.S. and European investors.17 Developing countries and
some scholars began to look at ICSID critically, formulating a list of com-
plaints such as: ICSID's lack of financial and management structure to
face its increasing workload;' 8 ICSID's umbilical cord with the World
Bank;19 concerns by some Latin American states that hostility toward IC-
SID may hamper access to World Bank credit;20 the pressure on develop-
ing countries to resort to assistance from extremely expensive foreign law
firms;2 1 non-commercial interests, such as health or environmental pro-
tection have not received adequate attention;22 a lack of transparency by
arbitration panels; 23 a shadow of arbitrator bias in favor of the investor,
with different ad hoc tribunals analyzing similar cases reaching disparate
results; 2 4 the absence of an appeals process, but only a limited annulment
procedure; 25 failure to take into account situations of massive economic
downturns; 26 cracks in its system of voluntary enforcement and compli-
ance with the award, with some foreign investors losing their faith in Ar-
gentina's willingness to honor ICSID awards.27
In connection with the latter, Argentina is the most significant example
of how a member state of ICSID is making use of the tools provided by
17. ICSID CASELOAD STATIsTics, supra note 2, at 7.
18. David Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication in International Law, 46 CotUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 563, 610 (2008).
19. See About ICSID, Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv.Disputes, http://icsid.worldbank.
org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&page
Name=AboutICSIDHome (last visited Sept. 5, 2010).
20. Andres Rigo Sureda, ICSID: An Overview, 13 Woiu.o Aui. & MEDIATION REP.
166, 166-67 (2002).
21. Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field: Is it Time for a Legal Assistance Center
for Developing Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 22 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev.
237, 252-54 (2007); Azid Choudry, Bilateral Trade and Investment Deals: A Serious
Challenge to Global Justice Movements, Grain.org, Dec. 2003, http://
www.grain.org/rights/tripsplus.cfm?id=2.
22. Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of ICSID to
the Third World, 8 SAN DIEGO INT'L L. J. 345, 385 (2007).
23. Daniel Barstow Magraw Jr. & Niranjali Manel Amerasinghe, Transparency and
Public Participation in investor-State Arbitration, 15 ILSA J INT'L & COMP L 337
(2009).
24. Matthew C. Porterfield, An International Common Law of Investor Rights?, 27 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 79, 102 (2006).
25. Christian J. Tams, An Appealing Option? The Debate about an ICSID Appellate
Structure, Beitrage zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht, Heft 57 [Contributions
to Transnational Commercial Law, Book 57] (2006), available at
www.economiclaw.uni-halle.de/Heft57.pdf.
26. Charity L. Goodman, Unchartered Waters: Financial Crisis and Enforcement of
ICSID Awards in Argentina, 28 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 449, 484 (2007); Paolo di
Rosa, The Recent Wave of Arbitrations Against Argentina Under Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties: Background and Principal Legal Issues, 36 U. MIAMI IN1E-AM. L.
REv. 41, 73 (2004).
27. Andrew P. Tuck, Investor-State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the Re-
visions and Proposed Reforms to the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,
13 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 885, 902-11 (2007).
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the Convention for challenging awards rendered against the host country.
In the Argentine case, many foreign investors had obtained licenses from
local government to operate public services. 28 These licenses provided
that the users' rates were to be calculated in U.S. dollars, converted to
Argentine pesos at the time of invoicing, and adjusted every six months
according to the U.S. producer price index. 29 These rates stopped being
updated as a result of the economic crisis of 2001 and Argentina passed
the Public Emergency and Currency Exchange Regulations Reform Act,
which abolished the dollar-to-peso convertibility and devaluated the lat-
ter currency. 30 Emergency tariffs were henceforth fixed in pesos at the
compulsory exchange rate of one peso per dollar, which became known
as the "pesification" of tariffs.31
Under these circumstances, many investors turned to ICSID alleging
BIT violations (e.g., failure to honor commitments made by Argentina
when it induced the claimants to make investments in Argentine indus-
tries; failure to accord fair and equitable treatment to claimants' invest-
ments; adoption of arbitrary measures that discriminate against the
claimants on the basis of their foreign nationality; indirect expropriation
of the claimants' investments without complying with the BIT's require-
ments).32 In most of these cases, ICSID arbitral tribunals found Argen-
tina liable, noting that the State had breached its obligations to give the
investor fair and equitable treatment and also failed to respect other in-
vestment commitments in the BITs.33 In a few cases the arbitral tribunals
accepted the defense of necessity alleged by Argentina.34 These awards
generated great concern to the Argentine government, which has devel-
oped several strategies to prevent, or at least delay, the payment of com-
pensation.35 Thus, the government resorted to Article 52 of the ICSID
28. DANIEL CHIDINOVSKY & ANORI2s LoEiz, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND SUSTAINA-
131,u DEV. IN ARGENTINA, 1, 11 (2008), available at http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/
rp/DP12ChudnovskyLopezApr08.pdf.
29. Frederick R. Fucci, Hardship and Changed Circumstances as Grounds for Adjust-
ment or Non-Performance of Contracts: Practical Considerations in Int'l Infrastruc-
ture Investment and Finance, INsTr. or INT'L COM. L., Apr. 2006, available at http://
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/fucci.html#29.
30. Martin D. Manzano, Political Risk in Argentina, LEX MUNDI, Sept. 2003, http://
www.lexmundi.com/images/lexmundi/pdflpg/articlel-marval.pdf.
31. Id.
32. ClIUDNOVSKY & LOPrz, supra note 28, at 13.
33. Jean E. Kalicki, ICSID Arbitration in the Americas, Arb. Rev. of the Americas, 1,
5, July 11, 2006, available at http://www.arbitralwomen.org/files/publication/
4911201000239.pdf.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16,




Convention 36 to seek the annulment of awards,37 requested a stay in the
enforcement of the award based on Rule 54 of the ICSID Rules of Arbi-
tration,38 and in cases governed by the UNCITRAL Rules, challenged
the awards before the courts of the seat if the tribunal had applied the
UNCITRAL Rules.39
Nicaragua v. Barcel6 is another recent example of how the tables are
now turning regarding the relationship between Latin America and IC-
SID. Host states are beginning to resort to ICSID for their own benefit,
just as investors have been doing for decades. On June 25, 2008, the gov-
ernment of Nicaragua filed before ICSID a USD$30 million lawsuit
against the Spanish company Barcel6.40 The Nicaraguan government ar-
gued that Barcel6 did not comply with some yearly payments owed to the
government regarding a Nicaraguan tourist center operated by Barcel6. 41
It is the third time in the history of ICSID-an organization that has
more than 300 claims arbitrated to its credit-that a state, rather than a
private investor, filed a claim before this international institution.42 In
this case, the Spain-Nicaragua BIT was used as a "bargaining chip" by
Nicaragua in order to force the investor to settle the case. 4 3 The strategy
36. See ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules: Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Ch. IV, art. 52,
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoclCRR-English-fi-
nal.pdf [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
37. Some of these maneuvers have been successful for Argentina. For example, the
recent Decision on annulment in Sempra v. Argentina stated that: "In considera-
tion of the foregoing, the Committee unanimously decides to: Annul the Award of
28 September 2007 on the ground of manifest excess of powers (Article 52(1)(b) of
the Convention) owing to the failure of the Arbitral Tribunal to apply Article XI
of the BIT between the United States and the Argentine Republic concerning Re-
ciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment of 14 November 1991: such
annulment applies necessarily to the Award in its entirety, pursuant to Article
52(3) of the Convention. Order Sempra to reimburse to the Argentine Republic
all of the expenses incurred by the Centre in connection with the Annulment pro-
ceeding, including the fees and expenses of the arbitrators". See Sempra Energy
Int'l, supra note 35.
38. ICSID Convention, Regulations, and Rules: Rules of Procedure for Arbitration
Proceedings, Ch. VII, Rule 54, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Stat-
icFiles/basicdoc/CRREnglish-final.pdf [hereinafter ICSID Arbitration Rules].
Being aware of the Argentinean's intentions, the ad hoc committees constituted
for the annulment proceedings of the cases Enron, Vivendi, and Sempra, unsuc-
cessfully ordered Argentina to provide enough economic security-under the form
of an undertaking, bank guarantee, escrow, etc-as a condition to grant the required
stay of enforcement. Sempra Energy Int'l, supra note 35, at 3-5.
39. Sylvia Noury & Caroline Richard, International Arbitration in Latin America:
Overview and Recent Developments in The International Comparative Legal Guide
to International Arbitration 2008, INT'. CoMr. LIEGAi Guiu Sr'Rus's, 276 (2008),
available at http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/2574.pdf.
40. Fernando Cabrera Diaz, South American Alternative to ICSID in the Works as
Governments Create an Energy Treaty, INv. TREATY NEWS, Aug. 6, 2008, http://
www.investmenttreatynews.orgicmslnewslarchive/2008108106/south-american-ater-
native-to-icsid-in-the-works-as-governments-create-an-energy-treaty.aspx.
41. Luis Carlos Nino, Nicaragua Takes Spanish Firm to Court over Tourist Centre Dis-
pute, Global Insight, June 26, 2008. http://www.ihsglobalinsight.com/.
42. Fernando Cabrera Diaz, supra note 40.
43. See generally Acuerdo Para la Promocion y Proteccion Reciproca de Inversiones
Entre el Reino de Espana y la Republica de Nicaragua [Agreement between the
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was successful. Nicaragua and Barceld reached an agreement, resulting
in Barcelo's reinvestment in Nicaraguan infrastructure.4 4
This introduction has focused on some actions undertaken by Latin
American states within the framework of ICSID, which have reflected
dissatisfaction with how this organization functions. 4 5 I will now turn my
attention to a complementary issue which has remained unexplored by
previous academic papers: the legal and political ways in which Latin
American nations are opposing the ICSID system from outside of its
framework. The aim of this paper is to provide a response to the follow-
ing question: Is the current displeasure with ICSID in some Latin Ameri-
can countries likely to continue and spread to other countries throughout
the region, and if so, why?
II. LATIN AMERICA V. ICSID
A number of signs point to an increasing backlash in Latin America
against ICSID. There are different ways in which Latin American na-
tions are showing their reluctance to resort to ICSID arbitration and try-
ing to "think out [sicl the ICSID box." The discussion will focus first on a
series of initiatives undertaken individually by some Latin American
countries and will subsequently turn to some projects developed in Latin
America at the regional level.
Kingdom of Spain and The Republic of Nicaragua on the Promotion and Recipro-
cal Protection of Investments], Spain-Nicar., Jun. 28, 1995, 1872 U.N.T.S. 31982,
available at http://untreaty.un.org/unts/120001 144071/9/4/00007086.pdf.
44. Interestingly, this Understanding provides that any disputes will be resolved, not
resorting to ICSID arbitration but to the International Chamber of Commerce.
Entendimiento Marco Entre el Gobierno de Nicaragua y cl Grupo Barcelo [Un-
derstanding Between the Government of Nicaragua and the Barcelo Group], Ni-
car.-Barcelo Group, art. IV, June 2009, available at http://www.cornap.gob.nil
imagenes notas/caso motelimarcornap 2009.pdf.
45. Following this trend, Latin America continues to generate new controversies re-
garding ICSID arbitration. To cite three recent examples, a Canadian company
building an airport in Ecuador initiated ICSID arbitration proceedings, but it was
suspended in January 2010 because the parties began to negotiate an agreement.
See Fernando Cabrera Diaz, Consortium Building New Quito Airport Takes Ecua-
dor to ICSID, bilaterals.org, Feb. 14, 2010, http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?arti-
cle16804. In February 2010, the arbitrator appointed by Perenco, the Ecuadorian
oil company, was removed from the case following a challenge by Ecuador, who
questioned his independence after the arbitrator was interviewed about the case.
Fernando Cabrera Diaz, Perenco-nominated Arbitrator Disqualified for Interview
Comments in ICSID Dispute with Ecuador, INv. TREATY Nuws, Feb. 14, 2010,
http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2010/0 2/10/perenco-nomi-
nated-arbitrator-disqualified-for-interview-comments-in-icsid-dispute-with-ecua-
dor.aspx. In addition, in March 2010 the U.S. oil service company, Tidewater Inc.,
filed a request for ICSID arbitration against Venezuela, alleging Venezuela's fail-
ure to pay any compensation for the expropriation of Tidewater's vessels.
Arundhati Ramanathan, Tidewater Seeks Arbitration for Disputes in Venezuela,
REUTERs, Feb. 17 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUKSGE61GOMK20100
217?type=companyNews.
DAVID VERSUS GOLIATH?
A. RESORTING TO THE CONSTITUTION TO NOT COMPLY WITH
ICSID AWARDS
Article 54 of the ICSID Convention states the following: "Each Con-
tracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Conven-
tion as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that
award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that
State."46 Despite the clear wording requiring automatic enforcement,
representatives of the Argentine government and several local academics
consider that ICSID awards should be subject to judicial scrutiny in Ar-
gentina. Dr. Horacio Rosatti, the former Argentine Minister of Justice, is
a staunch supporter of this approach, now called the "Rosatti Doc-
trine." 47 His position is that ICSID favors foreign investors and therefore
discriminates against local investors. 48 Believing that this situation vio-
lates the Argentine Constitution's principle of equality before the law, he
contends that courts should review ICSID awards. 49 From his point of
view, Articles 27 and 75.22 of the Argentine Constitution lead to the con-
clusion that BITs and the ICSID Convention are subordinate to the
Constitution.50
Although Rosetti's tenets are considered unorthodox internationally, 51
the Argentine government continues to defend these ideas today. On
June 1, 2004, the Argentine Supreme Court decided the domestic case
Jose Cartellone Construcciones Civiles S. A. v. Hidroelectrica Norpatagon-
ica S.A. This decision is cited by Argentine scholars who propose its find-
ings should be extrapolated to ICSID awards.52 In this case, the Supreme
Court stressed that it is guardian of the Constitution and public policy
and therefore it may review arbitral awards if it finds the awards "uncon-
stitutional, unreasonable or illegal," even when the parties involved had
46. ICSID Convention, Ch. IV, art. 54.
47. Alvaro Torriglia, La Politica de Servicios Publicos de un Pais no se Puede Dirimir
en el Ciadi [A Country Cannot Settle the Politics of Public Services in the ICSID],




50. Horacio D. Rosatti, Los Tratados Bilaterales de Inversion, el Arbitraje Interna-
cional Obligatorio y el Sistema Constitucional Argentino [Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties, Binding International Arbitration and the Argentine Constitutional System],
ECONOMIC COMM'N Foiz LAnIN AM., Sept. 26, 2003, http://www.eclac.org/drni/
noticias/noticias/7/13167/12.pdf; Horacio D. Rosatti, La Politica de Servicios Pub-
licos de un Pais no se Puede Dirimir en el Ciadi [The Politics of Public Services a
Country Cannot Settle in the ICSID], LACAPITAL.COM, Feb. 6, 2005, http://
archivo.Iacapital.com.ar/2005/02/06/economia/noticia_1 69607.shtml.
51. See generally Anibal Sabater, The Weakness of the Rosatti Doctrine: Ten Reasons
Why ICSID's Standing Provisions Do Not Discriminate Against Local Investors, 15
AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 465 (2004).
52. Javier Perotti, Consideraciones Del Caso Argentino Ante la Jurisdicci6n del Ciadi
[Considerations of the Argentine Case to the Jurisdiction of the ICSID], CENTRO
ARGENTINo DE Es-runaos INTERNACIONALEs (2008), http://www.caei.com.arles/
programas/ooii/08.pdf.
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previously agreed to waive the right to appeal. 53 The Argentine govern-
ment made another argument to prove that ICSID awards generate con-
stitutional violations. It asserted that the Argentine statutes on
submitting disputes to ICSID are unconstitutional because they were ap-
proved without following the process established in the 1994 Constitu-
tional reform. 54 In addition, Argentine senators have presented some
bills, Proyectos Capitanich, Fald, Marino and Miller,55 proclaiming that
the country will not allow international awards that cannot be contested
before the Supreme Court of Argentina. 56
These types of constitutional arguments have also been raised in rela-
tion to the BITs in Colombian57 and Bolivian courts.58 Although in these
53. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Jus-
tice], 01/06/2004, "Jos6 Cartellone Construcciones Civiles S.A. v. Hidroelkctrica
Norpatag6nica S.A. o Hidronor S.A./Arbitraje," Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.S.]
(2004-111-48), available at http://federacionuniversitarial4.blogspot.com/2008/04/
jos-cartellone-construcciones-civiles.html.
54. Carlos E. Alfaro & Pedro M. Lorenti, The Growing Opposition of Argentina to
ICSID Arbitral Tribunals, 6 J. Wou I) INV. & TRADiE 417, 426-27 (June 2005),
available at http://www.alfarolaw.com/imaltapa/Pedro%20Alfaro.pdf.
55. Proyecto de Ley 4504/04 presentado por el Senador Capitanich [Bill 4505/04 sub-
mitted by Senator Capitanich), Feb.14, 2005, http://www.senado.gov.arlwebt
proyectos/verExpe.php?origen=S&tipo=PL&numexp=4504/0 4 &nrocomision=&
tConsulta=1; Proyecto de Ley 6928-D-05 presentado por los Diputados FaI y Ma-
rino [Bill 6928-D-05 submitted by Representatives Fald and Marino], Feb. 8., 2006,
http://www3.hcdn.gov.ar/folio-cgi-bin/om-isapi.dll?clientlD=255409229&adv-
query=6928-D-05&infobase=tp.nfo&record={AFE3}&recordswithhits=on&
softpage=proyecto; Proyecto de Ley 378/05 presentado por la Sen. Muller [Bill
378/05 submitted by Senator Moller], Mar. 15, 2005, http://www.senado.gov.ar/
web/proyectos/verExpe.php?origen=S&numexp=378/05&tipo=PL&tConsulta=1;
Proyecto de Ley 532/05 presentado por la Sen. Muller [Bill 532/05 submitted by
Senator Muller], Mar. 29, 2005, http://www.senado.gov.ar/web/proyectos/verExpe.
php?origen=S&numexp=532/05&tipo=PL&tConsulta=1.
56. Mariana Herz, La Irrevisabilidad de Los Laudos Arbitrales Del CIADI Por Los
Jueces Nacionales: La Doctrina Rosatti y Los Proyectos Legislativos [ Non-review
of ICSID Awards: by national judges: Rosatti Doctrine and National Legislative
Projectsi, 214 Ei- Dewacuo 799 (2006), available at http./lpapers.ssrn.com/sol31
papers.cfm?abstractid=917462.
57. In this sense, the court stated that: "Las disposiciones del Acuerdo que aquf se
analizan encajan tambi6n dentro de lo dispuesto por los articulos 226 y 227 de la
Constituci6n, que ordenan al Estado promover la internacionalizaci6n de las rela-
ciones politicas, econ6micas, sociales y ecol6gicas sobre bases de equidad,
reciprocidad y conveniencia nacional, al igual que la integraci6n econ6mica, social
y politica con las demis naciones." ["These provisions discussed here fit well
within the provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, which require the
State to promote the internationalization of political, economic, social and ecologi-
cal basis of equality, reciprocity and national interest, as the economic, social and
political integration with other nations."], Sentencia de la Corte Constitucional C-
294/02 (Colo.) available at www.dmsjuridica.com/CODIGOS/LEGISLACION/
Sentencias/C-294-02.rtf.
58. The court concluded that: "De acuerdo a los fundamentos del presente fallo, se
concluye que las Leyes Ratificatorias sometidas a control de constitucionalidad a
trav6s de este recurso, no son contrarias a las normas contenidas en los arts. 135 y
228 de la CPE." ["According to the fundamentals of this ruling, we conclude that
the ratification laws subject to constitutional review through this appeal is not con-
trary to rules found in arts. 135 and 228 of the CPE."], Sentencia Constitutucional
No. 0031/2006 (Colom.), (May 10, 2006), available at http://www.ciac-iacac.org/
documentos/2007_3_6_9_17_49_SENTENCIA%200031 %20DEL%202006.pdf.
DAVID VERSUS GOLIATH?
cases, the courts have concluded that bilateral investment treaties do not
violate the Constitution, new Latin American constitutions have been en-
acted introducing a number of outright anti-arbitration provisions that
will have an important impact on the future of investment arbitration in
these countries. For example, Article 366 of the 2009 Bolivian Constitu-
tion states that, "[a]ll foreign companies operating in the oil and gas sec-
tor are subject to the sovereignty of the State and under no circumstances
will a foreign tribunal be recognized nor can international arbitration or
diplomatic interventions be resorted to."5 9 Article 422 of the 2008 Ecua-
dorian Constitution prohibits the enactment of treaties or international
instruments in which Ecuador cedes sovereign jurisdiction to interna-
tional arbitration. 60 Based on this article, the Ecuadorian Constitutional
Court declared in July 2010 the unconstitutionality of a number of BITs
and others, such as the U.S.-Ecuadorian BIT, are still in process of
revision.61
B. NATIONAL COURTS RESISTING ICSID
The Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal Decision 1541/200862 and its subtle-
ties can be summarized by the Spanish saying: "When you see your
neighbor's beard burn, soak your own." In this case, the Venezuelan Re-
public presented a request for interpretation of Article 258.2 of the 1999
Constitution. This article asserts broadly that, "[t]he law shall promote
arbitration, conciliation, mediation and any other means of alternative
dispute resolution." 63 In a record time of four months, the Constitutional
Chamber of the Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal of Justice issued a decision
on the matter, which was extended and densely riddled with scholarly
references. 64 Therein, the Court addresses several controversial issues of
national and international arbitration, waiting until the end to deal with
the issue that was possibly the most significant of all its reflections: Arti-
cle 22 of the Law for the Promotion and Protection of Investment does
not contain a unilateral general declaration of consent to ICSID arbitra-
tion.6 5 This Venezuelan law of 1999, enacted during the Chavez era,
59. Political Constitution of the Republic of Bolivia, art. 366 (Bol.), available at http://
pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Bolivialbolivia09.htm.
60. Eric Gillman, The End of Investor-State Arbitration in Ecuador? An Analysis of
Article 422 of the Constitution of 2008, AM. Riy. INT'L Aiiu. 269, 269 (2008); CON-
STITUION i)n ECUAnoiz, art. 42 (Ecuador), available at http://pdba.georgetown.
edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador08.html.
61. Katia Fach Gomez, La Corte Constitucional ecuatoriana declara la inconstitucion-
alidad de varios Tratados Bilaterales de Inversidn [Ecuadorian Constitutional Court
declares the Unconstitutionality of some Bilateral Investment Treaties], Sept. 2,
2010, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1670863.
62. El Tribunal Supremo de Justicia [The Supreme Tribunal of Justice], http:/
www.tsj.gov.ve/decisiones/scon/Octubre/1541-171008-08-0763.htm (last visited
Aug. 23, 2010) [hereinafter El Tribunal Supremo].
63. CONsTIruIoN OF THE Boi-rVARIAN Ri-PUBLC OF VEINEZUEIA, art. 258 (Venez.),
available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/venl999.html.
64. El Tribunal Supremo, supra note 62.
65. Id.
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states that:
Any dispute between an international investor, whose home country
has a treaty or agreement on promotion and protection of invest-
ments with Venezuela, or disputes falling within the provisions of the
ICSID Convention, will be submitted to international arbitration
under the terms of the respective treaty or agreement, if so this is
established, subject to the possibility of using, where appropriate, the
litigation option referred to in the current Venezuelan legislation. 66
Important effects arise if we connect the court's interpretation that Ar-
ticle 22 does not contain a state offer to arbitrate67 with another assertion
from the tribunal that: "[t]he single subscription of the ICSID Conven-
tion shall not, ipso jure, link the respective resolution of controversies
with the procedures contained in the Convention, without the existence
of the oft-alluded written and unequivocal manifestation of will."68 Spe-
cifically, it is interesting to compare how both statements contended in
the decision will have future influence on the way foreign countries are
going to solve their investment disputes with Venezuela. For instance, the
1997 Venezuela-Spain BIT contains a general offer to submit to ICSID in
Article XI.2.b. 69 This means that a Spanish investor will be able to go to
ICSID, even if the ICSID's denunciation has occurred, until the BIT's
survival clause is no longer in force.70 In contrast, the United States
never signed a BIT with Venezuela.7' Consequently, U.S. investors will
need the concurrence of an additional Venezuelan consent, in the form of
a contract, for example, in order to arbitrate under the rules of the ICSID
Convention. Considering the current state of the bilateral political rela-
tions between these States, it seems doubtful that Chavez's government
will be willing to enter into such binding contracts.72
66. Ley Sobre Promocion y Proteccion de Inversions, [Law on Promotion and Protec-
tion of Investments], art. 22 (Venez.), available at http://www.venezuelaencuba.co.
culcomercial/proteccion.html.
67. Ramon Alvis et al., Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal Issues Fundamental Decision on
Arbitration, Macleod Dixon, Oct. 23, 2008, available at http://www.macleoddixon.
com/documents/Bulletin-TSJ-issues fundamental decision-on-arbitration_
Oct_23_2008.pdf (criticizing that this conclusion is founded only on Venezuelan
law and not on international law).
68. El Tribunal Supremo, supra note 62.
69. Acuerdo Para la Promocion y Proteccion Reciproca de Inversiones Entre el Reino
de Espana y la Republica de Venezuela [Agreement between the Kingdom of
Spain and The Republic of Venezuela for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protec-
tion of Investments], art. 11, Spain-Venez., Nov. 2, 1995, available at http://www.
comercio.mityc.es/NR/rdonlyres/8F6BA107-CFC5-459B-A3FA-2468ED972F84/0/
VENEZUELA.pdf.
70. Francisco J. Pascual Vives, El Arbitraje de Inversiones en Los Recientes APPRI
Espanoles [Spanish investment arbitration in recent BITs], 18 Revista Electronica
de Estudios Internacionales 1, 14 (2009) (Sp).
71. FERNANDO CABRERA DIAz, American Gas Services Firm Exterran Files for Arbi-




72. Discussed further in the next section of this paper.
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In these last months, Venezuela has continued its process of "preven-
tive soaking."73 Once upon a time, Venezuelan courts showed, through
decisions such as the Exploration Round case, support for international
arbitration.74 Nevertheless, as an illustration of the present situation, the
Supreme Court of Justice issued on June 15, 2009 a press release stressing
its rejection of the classical configuration of international investment ar-
bitration.75 Under the title of "Venezuela's immunity against foreign
courts is consolidating," this public declaration, which theoretically has
no legal validity,7 6 states unequivocally that:
[T]he submission of disputes related to investment arbitration or any
other matter to international mechanisms must be approved by the
President of Venezuela and the Treaty must be ratified by the Na-
tional Assembly; on the basis of sovereignty, the state may denounce
or modify those international Treaties where Venezuela was subject
to a foreign jurisdiction; the enforcement of decisions rendered by
foreign tribunals against Venezuela will depend on the national ver-
ification that the decision is not breaching the sovereignty of the
country.77
Focusing on the exigency of this national control, there are presently
two pending cases in ICSID against Venezuela: Brandes Inv. Partners v.
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and CEMEX Caracas II Invs. B. V. v.
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.78 In the future, Venezuela may resort
to this "internal test" argument, borrowed from Argentina, to avoid com-
plying with any award ICSID renders against it.79 If this happens, ICSID
will be forced to address another legitimacy crisis. Taking into account
the Venezuelan environment, the access to diplomatic protection stated
in Article 27. 1 of the ICSID Convention will not be effective. Therefore,
foreign investors will probably see first-hand that Venezuela has managed
to effectively shield itself from ICSID awards.
73. Se Consolida la Inmunidad de Venezuela Frente a Tribunales Extranjeros [Vene-
zuela's Immunity in Relation to Foreign Tribunals is Consolidated], Tribunal
Supremo de Justicia, June 15, 2009, available at http://eanzola.com/images/uploads/
NotadePrensa -_TS_-_-15junio_09.pdf [hereinafter Venezuela's Immunity].
74. Andrew P. Tuck, Investor-State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the Re-
visions and Proposed Reforms to the ICSID and UNCITRA L Arbitration Rules, 13
L. & Bus. REv. AM. 885, 908 (2007) (noting that in August 1999, the Venezuelan
Supreme Court held that arbitration clauses contended in exploration agreements
were constitutional).
75. Venezuela's Immunity, supra note 73.
76. J. Eloy Anzola, Comentarios a Una Nota de Prensa del TSJ Venezolano [Com-
ments to a Press Release of the Venezuelan Supreme Court], www.eanzola.com,
June 17, 2009, http://eanzola.com/images/uploads/Comentarios-a-una-nota de_
prensa delTSJvenezolano.pdf.
77. Venezuela's Immunity, supra note 73.
78. ICSID Case No. ARBl0813 & ICSID Case No. ARBl08/15, available at http:/lic-
sid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (last visited Aug. 24, 2010).
79. Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Annul-
ment Proceeding, J 33 (Mar. 5, 2009), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/IC-
SID/FrontServlet (Decision on the Argentine Republic's request for a continued
stay of enforcement of the award according to Rule 54 of the ICSID Arbitration
Rules).
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C. CONTRACTS AVOIDING ICSID ARBITRATION
Some Latin American countries have in recent years made a clear shift
towards a so-called "resource nationalism," which involves placing the
world's oil reserves under the control of national oil companies, out of
the reach of international oil companies.80 This concerns countries like
the United States that have a strong energy dependence on oil and natu-
ral gas from Latin America.8
Bolivia serves as an example of this trend. The nationalization of the
hydrocarbons sector undertaken in the last century had been viewed neg-
atively in the international arena.82 Trying to change this situation, the
Bolivian Congress passed Law Number 1689 in 1996, which sought to at-
tract foreign investment by allowing mining exploration through joint
venture contracts.83 These contracts granted rights to foreign companies
for a period of forty years and included a clause to submit to international
arbitration processes whose awards would be final and binding.84
But, a few years later Evo Morales became President and approved the
nationalization of these sectors through Decree Number 28701.85 This
decree provides that the state assumes control of these resources and that
if foreign companies want to continue operations in Bolivia, they would
have to sign new contracts with the public company Yacimientos Pe-
troliferos Fiscales Bolivianos.86 The enactment of this Act generated a
"psychological impact" on foreign companies that were forced to negoti-
ate new, less profitable contracts-under which they have to pay up to
eighty-two percent of profits to the state in taxes-that eliminated ICSID
arbitration as a recourse.87
The evolution of the hydrocarbons sector in Venezuela has been very
similar to that of Bolivia. After the Hydrocarbons Law of 1943, which
nationalized the concessions granted to foreign companies in the past, the
nineties in Venezuela were known as the "Petroleum Opening" (Aper-
tura Petrolera).88 During that time, the country promoted the creation of
joint ventures with large foreign investors.89 But with the coming to
power of Hugo Chavez in 1999, the energy policy of Venezuela changed
and it focused on signing energy cooperation and integration agreements
80. Alexia Brunet & Juan Agustin Lentini, Arbitration of International Oil, Gas, and
Energy Disputes in Latin America, 27 Nw. J. INr'i_ L. & Bus. 591, 622 (2007).
81. Id. at 620.
82. Lindsay Sykes Pinto, Resolving the Bolivian Gas Crisis: Lessons from Bolivia's
Brush with International Arbitration, 39 Guo. WASH. INT'L L. Ri-v. 947, 948
(2007).
83. Id. at 947, n. 4.
84. Id. at 948; Kathryn B. Botham, Bolivia's Legal Gamble: Negotiating Nationaliza-
tion, 26 Wis. INT'L L.J. 507 (2008).
85. Bolivia: Presidential Supreme Decree 28701 (Nationalization of Hydrocarbons Sec-
tor), AM. Soc. OF INT'! L., May 1, 2006, http://www.asil.org/ilib060525.cfm#l1.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Michael J. Economides et al., The History of PDVSA and Venezuela, ENERGY
Tim., Jan. 17, 2007, http://www.energytribune.com/articles.cfm?aid=347&idli=1.
89. Id.
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within Latin America and the Caribbean, bringing this key economic sec-
tor under state control. 90 For example, in 2006, Venezuela adopted the
Terms and Conditions for the Establishment and Operation of Mixed En-
terprises.91 The government submitted this model contract, based on Ar-
ticle 151 of the Venezuelan Constitution,92 to the foreign oil companies
working in Venezuela. 93 It introduces a clause, which stressed that the
"amicable settlement" is the preferred method to resolve future conflicts
and if it is not possible, only the Venezuelan courts, and not international
arbitrators, are the competent venues for resolution. 94 This text, along
with the Regularization Law of April 18, 2006, which makes foreign in-
vestors minority shareholders of a mixed company, and other rules con-
tained in Venezuela's new provisions mean that the "Petroleum
Opening" has been completely reversed.95
The current legal landscape in these countries has resulted in the rejec-
tion of ICSID as a means to resolve many of the latest disputes over
natural resources. In recent years, there has been a significant increase in
the recourse to direct negotiation between the state and the foreign inves-
tor (for example, in cases such as: Petrobras-Ecuador, 96 Andes Petro-
leum-Ecuador,97 Perenco-Ecuador,98 Glencore-Bolivia,99 Aguas del
Illimani S.A - Bolivia, 00 Repsol YPF-Bolivia,10 Pluspetrol-Bolivia, Brit-
90. Stacy Rentner, Venezuela: How a Hydrocarbons Law Crippled an Oil Giant, 27
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 351, 361 (2004).
91. Gaceta Oficial de la Repdblica Bolivariana de Venezuela [Official Gazette of the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela], Mar. 31 2006, available at http://www.tsj.gov.
ve/gaceta/Marzo/310306/310306-38410-00.html [hereinafter Gaceta].
92. Id.; Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, art. 151 (Bol.), available
at http://www.analitica.com/bitbliotecalvenezuela/constitucion ingles.pdf.
93. Rentner, supra note 90, at 361-62.
94. Gaceta, supra note 91.
95. Elisabeth Eljuri & Victorino J. Tejera Perez, 21st-Century Transformation of the
Venezuelan Oil Industry, 26 J. ENiER;Y NATr. Ries. & ENVTL. L. 475, 488 (2008),
available at http://www.macleoddixon.com/documents/EljuriPerezarticle.pdf.
96. Petrobras Acept6 Entregar Mds Recursos Petroleros a Ecuador [Petrobras Agreed
to Hand Over Oil Resources to Ecuador], EL UNavERsO, Oct. 21, 2008, http://www.
eluniverso.com/2008/10/21/0001/9/FF9DD328FB6D4A9E924A43BB2Al9573E.
html.
97. Katerine Erazo, Ecuador, Andes Petroleum Likely to Sign New Production Con-
tract, RIGZONI, July 28, 2008, http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a-id=
64777.
98. Ecuador: Perenco Acepta Todas Las Condiciones y Firma Nuevo Contrato Pe-
trolero [Perenco Accepts All Conditions and Signs New Energy Contract], ECUA-
DOR INMEDIATO, Oct. 6, 2008, http://www.ecuadorinmediato.comlnoticias/89030.
99. Bolivia Nationalizes Glencore Antimony Smelter, REUTERS, May 2, 2010, http://
www.reuters.com/article/idUSNO216873420100502.
100. No Hay Pausa en la Campafia Contra el CIADI y en Solidaridad con Bolivia
[There Is No Pause to the Campaign Against the ICSID and in Solidarity in Bolivia]
FUNDAcION SOLON, http://funsolon.civiblog.org/blog/_archives/2008/2/25/3544351.
htmi (Feb. 25, 2008, 10:47 AM BOT).
101. Bolivia Firma el Nuevo Contrato Con Vintage y Total, Repsol YPF y Pretrobras lo
Hardn Hoy [Bolivia Signed a New Contract with Vintage, and Total, Repsol YPF
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ish Gas-Bolivia, Matpetrol-Bolivia,102 Total SA-Venezuela, 03 Statoil-
Venezuela, 104 BP PLC-Venezuela,105 and Eni-Venezuela,106 etc.).
The fact that the major oil companies are not choosing the option to go
to ICSID arbitration when this institution's awards have given them ma-
jor financial backing on numerous occasions can be evaluated from dif-
ferent perspectives. Perhaps it is an indication that these Latin American
countries are achieving an equal footing with large companies. Or per-
haps foreign investors have seen that contract renegotiation is a process
that can benefit both parties of the dispute. 0 7 Investors are aware that
the materials extracted in Latin America are scarce resources that will
remain in high demand by the industry in the future. Therefore, it may
be advisable, despite the reduction of profit margins, for these companies
to continue to cooperate with the state in the medium and long term and
to decline compensation in a particular arbitration.108
There is a question as to what will happen in the Latin American en-
ergy sector in the coming years. While a country like Venezuela may
have strained relations with many first-world countries, it remains an im-
portant oil exporter to countries like the United States.109 Thus, while
political relations between these two particular countries are deteriorat-
ing, bilateral economic interests are still intense.' o As highlighted in this
paper, the rising price of oil in recent years has led some countries in
Latin America to impose unilateral changes to the drilling contracts, with
the aim of taking control of this attractive sector.'11 Many foreign inves-
tors have accepted a more secondary role and have opted not to resort to
102. Franz Chavez, Oil Companies Decide to Stay-on Morales' Terms, IPS NIews, Oct.
30, 2006, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=35299.
103. TOTAL S.A.: Venezuela: Sincor Officially Transformed into a Mixed Company,
RiEU TERs, Feb. 8, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS157827+
08-Feb-2008+BW20080208.
104. Statoil, Total Agree Venezuela Compensation, On- DAILY, Feb. 1, 2008, http://goli-
ath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi-0199-8007566/Statoil-Total-agree-Venezuela-compensa-
tion.htmitabstract.
105. Chevron, BP PLC, Total y Statoil Firman Acuerdos con Venezuela y ConocoPhil-
lips y Exxon los Rechazan [Chevron, BP PLC, Total, and Statoil Sign Agreements
with Venezuela and Exxon and ConocoPhillips Rejected It], LUKOR, May 26, 2007,
http://www.lukor.com/not-neg/empresas/0706/26215431.htm.
106. Damon Vis-Dunbar, Venezuela Signs Contentious New Contracts with Foreign Oil
Companies, INv. TREATY NEWS, Apr. 1, 2006, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/
itn-aprilll_2006.pdf; Press Release, Eni, Eni Reaches Settlement Agreement with
Venezuela on Dacion Field (Feb. 15, 2008), available at http://www.eni.it/enIT/
media/press-releases/2008/02/2008-02-15-eni-reaches-settlement-agreement.shtml?
menu2=media-archive&menu3=press-releases.
107. Mercedes Ales, Leonardo Granato & Carlos Nahuel Oddone, Argentina Facing
International Claims over Foreign Investments, 14 LAw & Bus. REv. AM. 481, 492
(2008).
108. George K. Foster, Recent Setbacks for Foreign Investors in Latin America and what
they mean for the Future of Investment Treaty arbitration in the Region, 1 Latin
Am. Arb. Rev., 1 (2006).
109. Cesar Alvarez & Stephanie Hanson, Venezuela's Oil-Based Economy, Council on





ICSID, as they have considered it economically preferable to continue in
the country on a long-term basis. If oil prices decline in the future, these
Latin American countries may have to face a complicated situation: in-
comes will fall, foreign investors will struggle to survive in the country
and will fail to make any new investments, and the technical and financial
efficiency of the state-owned oil company will be questioned.112 If this
situation occurs, it is possible that resource nationalism will fade again.
D. WITHDRAWING FROM THE ICSID CONVENTION
During its fifth Summit on May 29, 2007, the countries which at the
time constituted the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America
(ALBA-Bolivia, Venezuela and Nicaragua) agreed to denounce the IC-
SID Convention.113 As President Evo Morales held, this decision was
taken in order to ". . . guarantee the sovereign right of countries to regu-
late foreign investment in their national territories." 1 4 In line with this
decision, on February 13, 2008, the President of the Energy Commission
in the Venezuelan National Assembly asked the government for an IC-
SID withdrawal.' 5 On April 14, 2008, Nicaragua's Attorney General an-
nounced that the country was also pondering denouncing the ICSID
Convention.1' 6 Nevertheless, these two threats have not come to fruition
since neither of the two states has officially begun the process required to
denounce ICSID.
Bolivia and Ecuador, however, carried out the threat. On May 2, 2007,
the World Bank received a written notice of denunciation of the ICSID
112. Larry B. Pascal, Developments in the Venezuelan Hydrocarbon Sector, 15 LAw &
Bus. REV. AM. 531, 572-573 (2009).
113. Cuba was also an ALBA member, but not an ICSID member State. Fernando
Cabrera Diaz, ALBA Moves Forward with Plan to Create Regional Investment Ar-




114. ALBA countries "vigorously reject legal, media, and diplomatic pressures from
certain multinational companies, which having violated constitutional rules; do-
mestic legislation; contractual agreements; and regulatory, environmental, and la-
bour provisions; resist the application of sovereign decisions of the countries by
threatening with arbitration and commencing international arbitration proceedings
against the States before institutions such as ICSID." Fernando Pel6ez-Pier et al.,
Venezuela, ARn. REV. AM., 2008, available at http://www.globalarbitrationreview.
com/reviews/4/sections/8/chapters/49/venezuela/; Latin America Ponders Pullout of
ICSID, Dise. RESOL. J., May-Jul. 2007, available at http://findarticles.com/p/arti-
cles/mi-qa3923/is 200705.
115. Fernando Cabrera Diaz, South American Alternative to ICSID in the Works as
Governments Create an Energy, INV. TiRATY NEws, Aug. 6 2008, http.11
www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2008/08/06/south-american-alter-
native-to-icsid-in-the-works-as-governments-create-an-energy-treaty.aspx.
116. AN Exhorta Abrir Investigaci6n Sobre Constituci6n de Apertura Petrolera [AN Ex-
horts to Open Investigation on Constitution of Petroleum Opening], RADIo NA-
CIONAL DE- VENEZUELA, Feb.13, 2008, http://www.rnv.gov.ve/noticias/index.php?
act=ST&f=2&t=60618.
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Convention from the Republic of Bolivia.117 In the official note sent to
President of the World Bank, Bolivia criticized a number of aspects of
ICSID such as its complexity, opacity, lack of neutrality, high cost, no
appeal of the award, and also emphasized Articles 24 and 135 of the Bo-
livian Constitution, 8 arguably calling for a Bolivian withdrawal.' 19 Pur-
suant to Article 71 of this Convention, the denunciation took effect on
November 3, 2007, six months after receipt of such notice.120
The effects of denouncing this Convention have been broadly discussed
by scholars. The starting point of this debate is the wording of Article 72
of the ICSID Convention, which reads:
[n]otice by a Contracting State pursuant to Articles 70 or 71 shall not
affect the rights or obligations under this Convention of that State or
of any of its constituent subdivisions or agencies, or of any national of
that State arising out of consent to the jurisdiction of the Centre
given by one of them before such notice was received by the
depositary.121
Academics are divided as to the effects of this notice and to the effects
of consent. The debate can be summarized as follows: from a chronologi-
cal standpoint, there are three possible moments when a foreign investor
may not raise a claim before ICSID: (1) the date on which the Center
receives the denunciation of the country, (2) the end of the six-months
period cited in Article 71, or (3) the expiration date of the BIT for both
parties, regardless of the State previously denouncing of the ICSID Con-
vention. 122 The first option implies that Bolivian BITs are a mere offer to
consent that should be completed with a written acceptance given by the
investor before May 2, 2007. The second option would allow investors to
117. Press Release, ICSID, Bolivia Submits a Notice under Article 71 of the ICSID
Convention, May 16, 2007, available at http://ICSID.worldbank.org/ICSID/Stat-
icFiles/Announcement3.html; Bolivia Solo Tiene un Caso Pendiente en el CIADI
[Bolivia Has only a Pending Case at ICSID], El Banco Mundial, http://web.
worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/BANCOMUNDIAL/EXTSPPAISESI
LACINSPANISHEXT/BOLIVIAINSPANISHEXT/O,,contentMDK:21567378-
pagePK:141137-piPK:141127-theSitePK:500410,00.htmi (last visited Sept. 1,
2010).
118. "Articles of the 1967 Constitution with 1994 reforms, agreed text of 1995 and re-
forms of 2002, 2004 and 2005. In 2009, Bolivia passed a new constitution that
reinforces these approaches." POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF"n H REPunLc oF Bo-
LIVIA, arts. 24, 135.
119. Maria Urturi, Bolivia Se Retira Del CIA DI [Bolivia Withdraws from the ICSID],
Vigilancia Social de los Procesos de Integraci6n y Las Negociaciones Comerciales,
http://www.inpade.org.ar/boletin/boletinvigilancia/vigilancia3.htm (last visited
Aug. 28, 2010).
120. "Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention by written notice to the
depositary of this Convention. The denunciation shall take effect six months after
receipt of such notice." See ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, Ch. X, art.
71.
121. Id. art. 72.
122. See Christian Tietje, Karsten Nowrot & Clamens Wackernagel, Once and Forever?
The Legal Effects of a Denunciation of ICSID, BEITRAGE ZUM TRANSNATIONALEN
WIRTSCHAFFSRECI IT, Mar. 8-9, 2008, available at http://www.wirtschaftsrecht.uni-
halle.de/Heft74.pdf.
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file a claim with ICSID until November 2, 2007. The third option would
permit the investor to file a claim with ICSID as long as the relevant BIT
remains in force.
On October 31, 2007, that is, four days before the end of the six-month
period under Article 71 of ICSID Convention, ICSID Secretary General
registered a request for arbitration against Bolivia by E.T.I. Euro
Telecom International N.V. Despite Bolivian objections to this registra-
tion, the arbitral tribunal was constituted and held a first session and a
later hearing.123 It was expected that the resolution of this case would
address the questions noted above,124 but on October 21, 2009, the arbi-
tral tribunal ordered the discontinuance of the proceeding 25 pursuant to
ICSID Arbitration Rule 44.126 Referencing the information provided by
the U.S. law firm that represented Bolivia in this arbitration, it was the
investor who unilaterally terminated the arbitration.127 But, Bolivia's tri-
umph in this case was marred by a somewhat bizarre epilogue: a former
Bolivian Minister, the Minister of Legal Defense of the State, is now be-
ing investigated for corruption, after signing two arbitration agreements
in 2009 with ETI governed by the UNCITRAL Rules.' 28
Ecuador's break with ICSID was less aggressive. In 2007, Ecuador
sought to escape ICSID's jurisdiction by resorting to Article 25.4 of the
ICSID Convention, providing for the exclusion of ". . . differences arising
on matters concerning the treatment of an investment, resulting from ec-
onomic activities concerning the use of natural resources such as oil, gas,
minerals or other . . ." from ICSID's jurisdiction.129 On July 6, 2009, Ec-
uador notified its withdrawal from the ICSID Convention. Ecuador's
withdrawal was decided in an Ecuadorian Executive Decree 30 in which
President Correa referred to the aforementioned Article 422 of the 2008
123. Id.
124. In 2009, the Russian Federation announced that it would withdraw from the En-
ergy Charter Treaty. But, similarly, scholars have noted that this State wi possi-
bly remain bound by the Treaty for a long period of time, even after effectively
withdrawing from the Energy Charter Treaty. Skadden: 2010 Insights 137
(Thomas H. Kennedy, ed., 2010), available at http://www.skadden.com/Cimages/
siteFile/Compendium%202010 Web%200nlyF.pdf.
125. Procedural Details, ICSID, http://ICSID.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?re-
questType=CasesRH&reqFrom=ListCases&caseld=C257&actionVal=viewCase
(last visited Aug. 28, 2010).
126. See ICSID Arbitration Rules, ch. V, Rule 44.
127. Arbitration before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes, Foley Hoag LLP, http://www.foleyhoag.com/Services/International-Litiga-
tion-and-Arbitration/experience.aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 2010).
128. Acusan a ex Ministra Rocabado de Corrupci6n y Ella se Defiende [Former Minister
Rocabado Accused of Corruption and She Defends], NOTICIASBOLIVIA, Jan.
19, 2010, http://boliviabb.com/2010/01/acusan-a-ex-ministra-rocabado-de-corrup-
cioni-y-ella-se-defiendel.
129. El Mercurio (Cuenca): No va Mds la Competencia del CIA DI [ICSID Competence
is over ], ECUADORINMEDIATO, Dec. 15, 2007, http://www.ecuadorinmediato.com/
Noticias/newsuserview/ecuadorinmediatonoticias-67075.
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Ecuadorian Constitution prohibiting Ecuador from concluding treaties or
international instruments that submit the State of Ecuador to interna-
tional arbitration. 131 Ecuadorian denunciation took effect on January 7,
2010, pursuant to Article 71 of the Convention.132
Law firms are trying to protect first-world investors from these Ecua-
dorian maneuvers. Before the deadline of six months provided in Article
71 of the Convention, investment lawyers advised their clients to carry
out actions of a different nature, including the following: (1) perfect Ec-
uador's general consent to ICSID jurisdiction by submitting a letter to the
Ecuadorian government which accepts this consent measure of question-
able efficacy taking into account the case of ETI Euro Telecom, (2) trans-
fer the investment to an affiliate in a country that has a BIT with Ecuador
which offers an effective dispute resolution mechanism, and (3) check the
company's political risk insurance coverage. 33
It goes without saying that foreign investors will do everything possible
to shield themselves against Ecuadorian anti-ICSID animosity. But,
there are more international arbitration mechanisms to solve disputes
arising from investments and they are still in use for investors despite the
ICSID withdrawal. For example, pursuant to Article VI of the Ecuado-
rian-U.S. BIT, investors may choose to submit their dispute in addition to
ICSID to an ad hoc tribunal under the UNCITRAL Rules. 134 Alterna-
tively, both parties may choose a different arbitral institution or arbitral
rules.135 This last alternative would also allow investors to begin arbitra-
tion under the ICSID Additional Facility rules (AF) against a non-signa-
tory-ICSID State.136 Even investors whose BITs do not contain as many
arbitral options may eventually benefit from arbitration if the most-fa-
vored-nation clause is to be applied to dispute settlement mechanisms.137
The elimination of these remaining options requires more laborious inter-
ventions from the Latin American states.
131. Republic of Ecuador: Constitution of 2008 art. 422, (Ecuador) available at http://
pdba.georgetown.edulConstitutions/Ecuador/ecuador08.htrnl.
132. Lis-r oiF CONTRACrlNG STATES AND OTER SIGNATORIES OF THE CONVENTION,
INT'L CTR. FOR SE-rrLEMENT OF INV. Dis'u-ns 4-5 (2010), available at http://IC-
SID.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServiet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=
ShowDocument&language=English.
133. Ecuador Moves Closer to Its Withdrawal from World Bank Arbitration, Crowell &
Moring, Jun. 23, 2009, http://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/Newsletter.aspx?id=
1251.
134. Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Ecuador, art. VI, Aug. 27, 1993, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 103-15 (1997).
135. Id.
136. Fernando Cabrera Diaz, Ecuador Prepares for Life After ICSID, While Debate




137. See Ignacio Vincentelli, The Uncertain Future of ICSID in Latin America 42
(Working Paper, 2009) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract id=1348016.
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E. BITS AS A ToOL AGAINST ICSID
1. Ostracizing ICSID in a new era of Latin American BITs?
It is interesting to study the most recent BITs adopted by several Latin
American countries in order to assess the extent to which some of these
countries have changed their policies about the settlement of interna-
tional disputes. Inconclusive research suggests that the vast majority of
Latin American states are still loyal to ICSID and therefore their BITs
continue to reference this international institution as a possible option for
investors willing to submit their disputes to a non-national organization.
In particular, these are some of the options included in recently
adopted BITs: the complaining party may begin an investment arbitration
either under ICSID or pursuant to ad hoc arbitration according to UNCI-
TRAL rules (Chile/Iceland 2006);138 ICSID, ad hoc arbitration following
UNCITRAL rules or the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris
(Nicaragua/Belgo-Luxemburg Economic Union 2005 and Paraguay/
Belgo-Luxemburg Economic Union 2005);139 ICSID or ad hoc arbitra-
tion (Guyana/China 2004 and Uruguay/Armenia 2008);140 State courts,
ad hoc arbitration UNCITRAL, ICSID or ICSID Additional Facility
(Colombia/Spain 2007);141 ad hoc arbitration UNCITRAL, ICSID or IC-
SID AF (Guatemala/Israel 2009);142 ICSID, ICSID AF, ad hoc arbitra-
138. Se Promulga el Convenio Entre el Gobierno de la Republica de Chile y el
Gobierno de la Republica de Islandia para la Promocion y Proteccion Reciproca
de las Inversiones [The Convention Between the Government of the Republic of
Chile and the Government of the Republic of Iceland for the Reciprocal Promo-
tion and Protection of Investments is adopted], Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional
(Aug. 12, 2006), http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/CHI
Iceland s.pdf.
139. Agreement Between the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union, on the one Hand,
and the Republic of Nicaragua, on the other Hand, on the Reciprocal Promotion
and Protection of Investments, Beig.-Lux.-Nicar., art. 12, 9 3, May 27, 2005, availa-
ble at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iialdocs/bits/BLEU-Nicaragua-eng.pdf;
Accord Entre l'Union Economique Belgo-Luxembourgeoise et la Re'publique du
Paraguay Concernant I'Encouragement et la Protection Re'ciproques Des Inves-
tissements [Agreement Between the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union and the
Republic of Paraguay on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ments], Belg.-Lux.-Para., art. 11, 2, Oct. 6, 1992, 2239 U.N.T.S. 339, available at
http://www.unctadorg/sections/dite/iia/docsbits/belglux-paraguay-fr.pdf.
140. Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the
Government of the Republic of Guyana on the Promotion and Protection of In-
vestments, P.R.C.-Guy., art. 9, % 4, Mar. 27, 2003, available at http://
www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china-guyana.pdf; Armenia-Uruguay:
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones [Armenia-Uruguay: Promotion
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments], Arm.-Uru., art. 7, 1 3, May 6, 2002,
available at http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/htmIstat/pl/acuerdos/acuel8277.htm.
141. Acuerdo Para la Promocio'n y Proteccio'n Reci'proca de Inversiones entre la
Repu'blica de Colombia y el Reino de Espan-a [Agreement for the Promotion
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between the Republic of Colombia and
the Kingdom of Spain], Colom.-Spain, art. XI, 1 2, June 9, 1995, available at http://
www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/spain colombiasp.pdf.
142. Agreement Between the Government of the State of Israel and the Government
of the Republic of Guatemala for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Guat.-lsr., Nov. 7, 2006, (U.N. Registration # 1-46618), available at
http://www.consortiumlegal.comffreaty%20Guatemala-Israel.asp.
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tion UNCITRAL or any other arbitration (Peru/Japan 2008);143 State
courts, ad hoc arbitration UNCITRAL, ICSID or ICSID AF (Panama/
Dominican Republic 2006);144 and only ICSID and ICSID AF (Suriname/
Netherlands 2005).145
Even Argentina, after its economic crisis, signed a BIT with Panama
where both parties agreed to accept ICSID's jurisdiction.14 6 This BIT
provision relying on ICSID is likely to have been negotiated before IC-
SID commenced rendering the many awards against Argentina. Or even
if Argentina's reluctance towards the ICSID had already existed, Argen-
tina did not want to show it with a "sister State" such as Panama.14 7
It has not been easy to find updated information on BITs signed by
Ecuador and Bolivia in recent years. The last references to these coun-
tries refer to BITs signed when Presidents Correa and Morales were not
in power. 1 4 8 Probably for this reason, these texts also maintain that IC-
SID is an appropriate mechanism for solving disputes between one con-
tracting party and an investor of the other contracting party (Bolivia/
Belgo-Luxemburg Economic Union 2004 or Ecuador/Italy 2005).149
Hugo Chavez's policy on this issue has been much more explicit. Previ-
ously, Venezuelan BITs referred to ICSID (for example, Venezuela/UK
143. Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Peru for the Promotion, Protec-
tion, and Liberalisation of Investment, Japan-Peru, art. 18, 9 4, Nov. 21, 2008,
available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/japan-peru.pdf.
144. Acuerdo Para la Promocion y Protecci6n Reciproca de las Inversiones Entre la
Repdblica de Panamd y la Repdblica Dominicana [Agreement for the Promotion
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between the Republic of Panama and
the Dominican Republic], Dom. Rep.-Pan., art. IX, 91 2, Feb. 6, 2003, available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iialdocs/bits/panama-repdominicana.pdf.
145. Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between
the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Suriname, Neth.-Sur., art. 9,9 1, Mar. 31, 2005, (U.N. Registration # 1-43652), available at http://www.
unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/netherlands-suriname.pdf.
146. Convenio Entre la Repdblica Argentina y la Repdblica de Panama para la Promo-
ci6n y Protecei6n de las Inversiones [Agreement Between the Republic of Argen-
tina and the Republic of Panama for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments], Arg.-Pan., art. 9, $ 3, May 10, 1996, available at http://www.
unctad.org/sections/dite/iialdocs/bits/argentina-panama-sp.pdf.
147. See ICSID Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties, ICSID, http://icsid.
worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServiet?requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH&action
Val=ViewBilateral&reqFrom=Main (last visited Sept. 18, 2010).
148. President Morales of Bolivia was first elected in 2005; President Correa of Ecua-
dor was first elected in 2006.
149. Accord Entre l'Union Economique Belgo-Luxembourgeoise et le Gouvernement
de la Re'publique de Bolivie Concernant I'Encouragement et la Protection
Re'ciproques Des Investissements [Agreement Between the Belgo-Luxembourg
Economic Union and the Government of the Republic of Bolivia for the Encour-
agement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments], Belg.-Bol.-Lux., art. 11, 1 3,
Apr. 25, 1990, 2240 U.N.T.S. 159, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/
iia/docs/bits/belglux-bolivia-fr.pdf; Convenio Entre el Gobierno de la Repdblica
del Ecuador y el Gobierno de Ia Reptiblica Italiana Sobre la Promoci6n y Protec-
cion de Inversiones [Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Ec-
uador and the Government of the Italian Republic About the Promotion and




1996).1so In the last few years, the Bolivarian Republic has signed BITs
with Cuba, Iran, the Russian Federation, and Belarus.' 5 ' These foreign
states, apart from being key oil and gas producing countries, are also well
known for not having a harmonious relationship with the United States.
All of these BITs include a provision regarding the settlement of inves-
tor-state disputes, which eliminates the ICSID option in favor of other
combinations: (1) state courts or ad hoc arbitration under the UNCI-
TRAL Rules (Venezuela/Cuba 2004); 52 (2) the third additional option of
a Stockholm Chamber of Commerce arbitration (Venezuela/Russian
Federation 2008);153 and (3) in the case of Venezuela/Iran 2006, the op-
tion between ad hoc UNCITRAL arbitration and International Chamber
of Commerce in Paris followed by the reference to ICSID "if both parties
are members of this Convention."1 54
As to the role that ICSID may develop in the prospective investment
controversies with Latin American nations, Venezuela currently has the
most firmly promoted anti-ICSID stance regarding new bilateral invest-
ment treaties. Time will tell if other countries in Latin America decide to
follow this policy. Even if they do not, the same results may be obtained
without negotiating new BITs with developed countries. In recent years,
there has been a worldwide deceleration in the number of signatories of
new BITs.155 These BITs are giving way to other types of agreements,
such as free trade agreements among countries, which are supposed to
150. Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Venezuela for the Pro-
motion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-Venez., art. 8, $ 2, Mar. 15, 1995,
available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uk-venezuela.pdf.
151. See, e.g., Acuerdo Sobre la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones En-
tre el Gobierno de la Reptiblica Bolivariana de Venezuela y el Gobierno de la
Repdblica Ishimica de Irtin [Agreement About the Promotion and Reciprocal Pro-
tection of Investments Between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran], Iran-Venez., Sumario: Asemblea Nacional, GACIA
OFICIAL NOMERO 38.389 (Caracas, Venez.), Mar. 2,2006, at 2-3, available at http:1
www.tsj.gov.ve/gacetalmarzo/020306/020306-38389-01.html (use the numbered
links to flip pages) [hereinafter Iran-Venez. BIT].
152. Acuerdo Sobre Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones entre el Reptib-
lica Boliviariana de Venezuela y el Gobierno de la Repdblica de Cuba [Agreement
About the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Republic of Cuba], Cuba-Venez., Dec.
11, 1996.
153. Acuerdo Entre el Gobierno de la Repdblica Bolivariana de Venezuela y el
Gobierno de la Federaci6n de Rusia Sobre la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca
de Inversiones [Agreement Between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and
the Government of the Russian Federation About the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments], Russ.-Venez., art. 9, $ 2, Nov. 7, 2008, available at
http://www.asambleanacional.gob.ve/index2.php?option=com-docman&task=doc
view&gid=1528&Itemid1.
154. Iran-Venez. BIT, supra note 51, art. 31, j 2. In reality, this is lusory because
Iran is a non-member State and the future of Venezuela as a member of ICSID is
quite dubious.
155. Emmanuel Gaillard, Anti-Arbitration Trends in Latin America, 239 N.Y.L.J. *1, at
*1 (2008), available at http://www.shearman.com/files/Publication/33b80659-ac58-
4ffd-821 7-2af9205ff1 c2/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/dbl 88d5f-038b-4950-
a9cf-2b7a752cd94b/lA_070208_03.pdf.
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have more bargaining power to avoid the imposition of ICSID
arbitration. 156
2. Widespread termination of BITs
In addition to this eventual ICSID ostracism, Venezuela and Ecuador
have initiated another striking mechanism for reducing ICSID's power-
the formal termination of preexisting BITs.
In May 2008, Venezuela gave the Netherlands notice of termination of
their BIT.'57 The Venezuelan-Dutch BIT, which entered into force on
November 1, 1993, had been highly criticized by the Venezuelan govern-
ment, which argued that non-Dutch companies incorporated in Holland
had fraudulently intended to profit from it.158 The breaking point was a
claim filed on October 10, 2007, by the Exxon Mobil Corporation (Ex-
xon) against Venezuela.' 59 Despite its U.S. origin, Exxon invoked ICSID
protection under the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT, arguing that the oil
project in Venezuela was meant to be developed by a Dutch shell com-
pany. 160 It seems that Venezuela's misgivings are not unfounded if one
takes into account the professional practice of law firms specializing in
international investment.161 One of the tips for drafting investor friendly
arbitration clauses is to structure those claims in such a way so as to gain
access to the arbitral jurisdiction provided under international investment
treaties: if the investor is not located in a country that has signed an in-
vestment treaty with the host state, the client is advised to structure its
investments through other countries, which have signed such a treaty with
156. The Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement is a recent example of an
Agreement that does not foresee the current application of any investor-state dis-
pute settlement mechanisms. U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl.,
May 18, 2004, 2004 U.S.T. LEXIS 162; see generally David Richardson, Foreign
Investment and the Australia United States Free Trade Agreement, CURRENT ISSUES
BRIEF No. 7 2003-04, 1, (Information and Research Services Parliamentary Li-
brary, March 8, 2004)(Austl.), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/
2003-04/04cib07.htm.
157. Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between
the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Venezuela, Neth.-Venez., art.
9, 91 1-2, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/
VENNetherlands.pdf [hereinafter Neth.-Venez. BIT].
158. Venezuela Denunciard a Finales de Abril Acuerdo de Protecci6n de Inversiones
Con Paises Bajos [Venezuela Will Denounce the Investment Protection Agree-
ment with the Netherlands at the End of April], VENEZOLANA )E; TELEVISION,
April 21, 2008, http://www.vtv.gov.ve/noticias-econ6micas/10131; Venezuela
Denunciard Acuerdo en Holanda Por "Abuso" de Exxon y Otras Empresas [Vene-
zuela Will Denounce Agreement in Holland Because of Abuse by Exxon and
Other Companies], EL ECONOMISTA, Apr. 21, 2008, http://www.eleconomista.es/
empresas-finanzasnoticias/489075/04108/Venezuela-denunciara-acuerdo-en-Ho-
landa-por-abuso-de-Exxon-y-otras-empresas.html.
159. Mobil Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (U.S. & Neth. v. Venez.), ICSID
(W. Bank) Case No. ARB/07/27 (2010).
160. Id. at 13.
161. Id. at 5-10.
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the host state. 162
In 2009, President Correa from Ecuador asked the National Assembly
to authorize the denunciation of thirteen of its BITs.163 The debate
within the legislative branch has been based on the new 2008 Constitu-
tion. Without much concern for the retroactivity issue, the Ecuadorian
National Assembly declared recently that these BITs violate Articles
416.12, 419 and 422 of the Constitution and that, therefore, the denuncia-
tion should be made.16
The measures taken by Venezuela and Ecuador have had a deep politi-
cal impact.165 Yet, the legal effect of these denunciations remains un-
known, as bilateral investment treaties usually contain a survival
clause.166 This clause allows investments made before the BIT termina-
tion date to remain protected by the same text during an ample period of
162. Rafael Llano Oddone, Arbitration Clauses for Cross-Border Contracts with Latin
American Countries, INT'L Disies. Q., Fall 2007, at 20, available at http://
www.whitecase.com/idq/fall-2007/tips/.
163. Decio Machado, Ecuador y la Denuncia de Los Tratados Bilaterales de Inversi6n
[Ecuador and the Denunciation of Bilateral Investment Treaties] *4 (2009), availa-
ble at http://www.cadtm.org/spip.php?page=article-pdf&id-article=5095. See gen-
erally BITs with USA, Switzerland, Venezuela, Chile, Argentina, Canada, China,
Netherlands, Germany, France, Finland and Sweden.
164. Republic of Ecuador: Constitution of 2008 art. 416, $ 12 ("Las relaciones del Ecua-
dor con la comunidad internacional responderin a los intereses del pueblo ecu-
atoriano, al que le rendirin cuenta sus responsables y ejecutores, y en
consecuencia: Fomenta un nuevo sistema de comercio e inversi6n entre los Es-
tados que se sustente en la justicia, la solidaridad, la complementariedad, la crea-
ci6n de mecanismos de control internacional a las corporaciones multinacionales y
el establecimiento de un sistema financiero internacional, justo, transparente y
equitativo"); Id. art. 419, $ 5-6 ("La ratificaci6n o denuncia de los tratados in-
ternacionales requerird la aprobaci6n previa de la Asamblea Nacional en los casos
que: 5. Comprometan la politica econ6mica del Estado establecida en su Plan
Nacional de Desarrollo a condiciones de instituciones financieras internacionales o
empresas transnacionales. 6. Comprometan al pais en acuerdos de integraci6n y
de comercio"); Id. art. 422 (No se podrd celebrar tratados o instrumentos interna-
cionales en los que el Estado ecuatoriano ceda jurisdicci6n soberana a instancias
de arbitraje internacional, en controversias contractuales o de indole comercial,
entre el Estado y personas naturales o jurfdicas privadas. . ."); see generally Kate
Joynes, Ecuador to Follow Bolivia, Amend All Bilateral Investment Treaties,
GLOBAL INSIGHT, May 15, 2007, at 2, http://www.ihsglobalinsight.com/; Posting of
Dr. Vethowen Chica Ar6valo, to Asemblea Nacional Rep6blica del Ecuador [Na-
tional Assembly of the Republic of Ecuador], http://asambleanacional.gov.ec/
blogs/vethowen chica/2009/10/29/la-denuncia-de-instrumentos-internacionales/
(Oct. 29, 2009); Boletines de Prensa [Press Release], Intensifican debate sobre
denuncia de Tratados de Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones [Intensifying debate
over denunciation of Reciprocal Investment Protection], Asemblea Nacional
Repdblica del Ecuador [National Aseembly of the Republic of Ecuador], (Nov. 5,
2009, 12:44 ECT) http://www.asambleanacional.gov.ec/200911051406/noticias/bole-
tines/intensifican-debate-sobre-denuncia-de-tratados-de-proteccion-reciproca-de-
inversiones.html.
165. Gillman, supra note 60.
166. See, e.g., Accord Entre la Confe'de'ration Suisse et la Re'publique de l'Equateur
relatif a' la Protection et a' l'Encouragement des Investissements [Agreement Be-
tween the Swiss Confederation and the Republic of Ecuador Regarding the Pro-
tection and Encouragement of Investments], Ecuador-Switz., art. 8, 1 3, http://
www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iialdocs/bits/ecuador switzerland-fr.pdf [hereinafter
Ecuador-Switz. BIT]; Neth.-Venez. BIT, supra note 157, art. 14, 1 3.
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time (for example, 10 years in the Ecuador-Switzerland BIT or fifteen
years in the case of the Venezuela-Netherlands BIT).16 7 Hence, the ef-
fects of these decisions will only be felt in the next decade.
It is possible that other Latin American nations will follow this trend in
the near future. For many years, the states of this region have envied the
position of Brazil, which has received abundant foreign investment de-
spite its complete lack of involvement in the international network of
BITs.16 8 Consequently, Latin America will probably turn back the clock
to a time when the Calvo doctrine will be reborn, or rather, will reawaken
from lethargy. The ultimate goal is no longer to be obliged by this kind of
BIT, which Latin American countries consider unfair.
3. Drafting New Model BITs
In their quest to encourage foreign investments, Latin American coun-
tries have signed BITs that have not been advantageous for them. But
moving forward, Latin American nations have realized that the content
of the BIT should better balance the rights and obligations of both par-
ties.169 This is important because ICSID arbitral tribunals base their deci-
sions on a detailed analysis of the contents of the BITs and "a word, or an
absence of one, can make the difference between an arbitration won or
lost." 70
As U.S. legal scholars report and as many of their Latin American
counterpart have noted, the United States has used BITs to introduce
substantial legal transplants in Latin America. BITs with Latin American
countries contain dispute resolution mechanisms reflecting U.S. common
law concepts that do not exist in the legal system of the host States. 71
These legal transfers constitute a new form of unilateralism. 7 2 From this
perspective, the growing disappointment of the nations of Latin America
with ICSID is understandable because the transfers of law contained in
the BITs are "externally dictated transplants", which are unlikely to grow
"in its new body."173
167. Id.
168. Brazil has signed fourteen BITs, but none of them has been ratified. Total Num-
ber of Bilateral Investment Treaties Concluded, United Nations Conference on
Trade & Dev., June 1, 2010, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite-pcbb/docs/
bitsbrazil.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2010).
169. See Sara Lidia Feldstein de Cardenas, Arbitraje e Inversiones Extranjeras [Arbitra-
tion and Foreign Investments], CENTRO ARGENTINO DE ESTuDIos INTERNACION-
ALES 23 (2005), available at www.caei.com.ar/es/programas/dildl4.pdf (indicating
that the authorities have to weigh the implications that the signing of BITs can
have for the future of the country).
170. Damon Vis-Dunbar, Analysis: Latin America's New Model Bilateral Investment
Treaties, Inv. Treaty News, July 17, 2008, http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/
cms/news/archive/2008/07/1 7/in-depth-latin-america-s-new-model-bilateral-invest-
ment-treaties.aspx.
171. See, e.g., Eric Gillman, Legal Transplants in Trade and Investment Agreements:
Understanding the Exportation of U. S. Law to Latin America, 41 GiEo. J. INT'L L.
263, 294-96 (2009).
172. Id. at 267.
173. Id. at 286-87.
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Some Latin American countries have recently announced their willing-
ness to create new Model BITs that are more favorable to developing
countries. The text of the new Model BITs that are currently being
drafted is unknown, but sparse information gathered from various
sources provide forecast of the most outstanding characteristics of the fu-
ture Model BITs.17 4
In 2006, the Bolivian government presented some guidelines for a fair
trade and cooperation treaty with the United States.175 This proposal,
untenable from the United States' perspective, underscores Bolivia's dis-
advantaged situation as "the history of Bolivia is one of an impoverished
country that for centuries has been an exporter of raw materials" to the
United States.176 Today, there is an enormous asymmetry between both
countries where "the GNP of the U.S. is 1,200 times greater than the
GNP of Bolivia."' 77 Thus, any BIT between both nations should take the
asymmetry into account.
Bolivia's claims for a fair BIT should help Bolivia ensure poverty re-
duction and a healthy environment; promote the ecological and indige-
nous farming that is valued and supported for its contribution to cultural
diversity; strengthen its "productive base and market systems so that Bo-
livian producers can take practical advantage of the new U.S. markets";
"preserve the property rights of the Bolivian State over its natural re-
sources"; "secure effective revenues for the country"; "promote stability
and sustainable growth"; "design trade rules based on special and differ-
ential treatment that take into consideration Bolivia's economic reality";
"respect Bolivian sovereign rights to guarantee access to affordable ge-
neric medicines and to essential services"; "and protect Bolivia's wealth
of traditional knowledge and rich biodiversity." 78
Consistent with this framework, the Bolivian government has stated
that mechanisms for setting international investment disputes must be
transparent, accessible, efficient and effective in addition to respecting
the framework established by the Bolivian Constitution and national
laws.17 9 After this Bolivian proposal was referred to the United States,
both countries did not conclude a BIT and in June 2009, President Evo
Morales declared his wish to conclude a "Peoples Trade Agreement" with
the United States, rather than a traditional "classical" free trade agree-
ment. 80 Nevertheless, President Morales acknowledged this process as a
174. Damon Vis-Dunbar, supra note 170.
175. Bolivian Government Guidelines for a Fair Trade and Cooperation Treaty with the






180. Morales Quiere Firmar un "Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos" Con EEUU
[Morales Wants to Sign a "Treaty of Commerce of the People" with the U.S.], June
26, 2009, http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?articlel544.
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difficult and slow-evolving objective. 81
There are three innovative aspects of the 2007 Colombian BIT
Model. 182 First, the model states that the "sole fact of a measure or series
of measures having adverse effects on the economic value of an invest-
ment does not necessarily imply that an indirect expropriation has oc-
curred."183 Second, the settlement of disputes section establishes a "fork-
in-the road" between national courts and national or international arbi-
tration. 184 Third, the new BIT condemns frivolous claims and does not
include an umbrella clause, precluding that a breach of a contract be-
tween a state and a foreign investor becomes a breach of the BIT. 85
The BIT Model that is being developed by Ecuador has been predeter-
mined by the content of the new Constitution of 2008. For example, pri-
ority will be given to national investment over foreign investment, rigid
rules on sovereignty over strategic resources and special sectors should be
set and international disputes will not be solved in extra-regional
forums. 186
In the preparation of these new models, Latin American countries
should take into account the Model of International Agreement on In-
vestment for Sustainable Development (IISD Model) developed by the
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD).18 7 This 2005
text presents itself as a living model aiming to "foster international invest-
ment that is supportive of sustainable development aspirations and re-
quirements in both the North and South."188 The IISD Model "develops
provisions that balance the rights and obligations of investors, host states
and home states."189 The institutional mechanism for the settlement of
disputes included in the IISD Model is very different from the ICSID
system.190
The United States has not remained immune to this revisionist trend.
In 2004, several U.S. civil society groups presented a set of alternatives to
the bilateral investment treaty model.191 Among them is a proposal to
181. Id.
182. Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments Between
the Republic of Colombia and , Colombian Model August 2007, arts. VI, IX,
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/inv model-bit-colombia.pdf.
183. See id. art. VI.
184. See id. art. IX.
185. See id.
186. Gustavo Guerra, Ecuador Investment Policy, http://www.iisd.org/investment/ca-
pacity/dciforum_2008.asp (last visited Sept. 12, 2010).




190. This model does not allow recourse to arbitral institutions such as ICSID and cre-
ates a new system of arbitration inspired by the WTO system. Konrad von Moltke,
A Model International Investment Agreement for the Promotion of Sustainable
Development 28 (2004), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/trade-model-inv.
pdf.
191. Letter from Jake Caldwell et al., Trade & Environment Program Manager, Na-
tional Wildlife Federation to Wesley Scholz, U.S. Department of State, Office of
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require the exhaustion of local remedies before going to international ar-
bitration, which is a stark reminder of the Calvo doctrine.1 9 2 In relation
to this issue, Latin American scholars acknowledge that if national courts
want to substitute ICSID tribunals in deciding these claims on interna-
tional investments, the legal systems of these countries must be improved
considerably.' 9 3 Ultimately, the deficiencies currently attributed to Latin
American legal systems (weak judiciary, culture of impunity, absence of
the rule of law culture, etc.) must be overcome. 19 4 Being aware that it Is a
long-term aspiration, along with a modernization of the substantive laws,
entire justice systems must be modernized, making them faster, more
transparent and more effective in order to avert the threat of a denial of
justice. 195
F. CREATION OF SPECIALIZED PUBLIc AGENCIES TO PROTECT
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FROM ICSID ARBITRATIONS
In recent years, several Latin American governments have created
groups specializing in addressing the legal aspects of the complaints filed
by foreign investors in international arbitration forums. A pioneering ini-
tiative in this area was the "Argentine Assistance Unit for the Arbitral
Defense," established on October 24, 2003.196 The Unit aimed to develop
and implement strategies both at the stage of amicable negotiation of dis-
putes arising from foreign investors and also in the arbitration proceed-
ings arising from the BITs. The effectiveness of this Unit has been
questioned in Argentina, since the cases before ICSID seem to be still
partially managed by foreign law firms. 197 Nevertheless, this governmen-
tal structure has inspired other countries in the region.
On April 10, 2007, Nicaragua created the "Interinstitutional Commis-
sion for the Defense of the Nicaraguan State against Investment Dis-
putes."1 98 The objective of this entity is to coordinate actions among
Investment Affairs and James Mendenhall, Office of the U.S. Trade Representa-
tive, Office of Services, Investment, and IPR (Jan. 16, 2004), available at http://
ciel.org/Publications/BITComments-Janl604.pdf.
192. Christoph Schreuer, Calvo's Grandchildren: The Return of Local Remedies in In-
vestment Arbitration, Int'l Courts & Tribunals 1 (2005) (Neth.), available at http://
www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/cspubl_75.pdf.
193. Carlos G. Garcia, All The Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin
America, & The Necessary Evil of Investor-State Arbitration, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L.
301, 322-23 (2004).
194. Id. at 323-27.
195. Hector A. Mairal, The Silence of the Argentine Courts, Inst. for Int'l Law & Justice
23, available at http://www.iilj.org/GAL/documents/HectorMairal.Thesilenceofthe
Argentinecourts.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2010).
196. Procuring the Treasure of the Nation, Decree No. 965 (2003), ptn.gov.ar/Institu-
cional/DECRETO%20965_.003.pdf.
197. Guglielmino Leave the Country Without Official Defense ICSID, lapoliticaonline,
July 31, 2009, http://www.lapoliticaonline.com.ar/noticias/val/ 5 9090/guglielmino-
deja-al-pais-sin-defensa-oficial-ante-el-ciadi.htmi (referring to the outsourcing of
this legal defense).
198. Decreto No. 28-2007, 9 Mar. 2007, Decreto creador de la comisi6n interinstitu-
cional para la defensa del Estado de Nicaragua por diferencias relativas a inver-
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different public administrations involved in the defense of Nicaragua in
international processes of alternative dispute resolution between the state
and foreign investors.199 On June 5, 2008, the Bolivian Government cre-
ated a new Ministry, responsible for the legal defense of the state
("Ministerio Sin Cartera Responsable de la Defensa Legal de las
Recuperaciones Estatales").200 Under the motto, "la patria no se vende,
se defiende" (the motherland is not for sale, but to be defended), 201 its
current head, Ms. Elizabeth Arismendi Chumacero, declared on January
25, 2010, "her commitment to work with honesty and responsibility in
defending national interests, dealing with international arbitrations, so as
to obtain clear answers on behalf of Bolivia." 202 Peru has also developed
a series of measures to react in a coordinated manner against interna-
tional investment disputes.203 It has created a committee that will re-
present the state during the whole process of the investment claim.2 0 4
This entity will also be responsible for managing and communicating pub-
lic information about contracts containing clauses on international dis-
putes settlement.205
G. REGIONAL INITIATIVES
In recent times, states in Latin America are pointing to the possibility
of different national Model BITs being replaced by a regional template.
Countries want a Model BIT to give them greater protection by, for ex-
ample, restoring the principles of the Calvo doctrine.206 Governmental
experts from various Latin American countries have proposed to adopt a
"Latin American Agreement on Investments Promotion and Protection"
(Acuerdo Latinoamericano de Promoci6n y Protecci6n de Inver-
siones). 207 The purpose of this Agreement is to create "the most exten-
sive area of uniform treatment of foreign investment, because the
geographic area will span from Mexico to Tierra del Fuego and give co-
herence to the region in its approach." 208 To obtain consensus on
sions [Creation of the Interdepartmental Commission for the Defense of the State
of Nicaragua of Investment Disputes] La Gaceta [L.G.] Apr. 10, 2007 (Nicar.).
199. Id.
200. Its first head was Mr. Victor Arce, former Viceminister of the Presidence. Hector
Arce is Already Minister of Defense, Diariocritico de Bolivia, June 6, 2008, http://
www.diariocritico.com/bolivia/2008/Juniolnoticias/79429/hector-arce.html.
201. Informacion Institucional, Ministerio de Defensa Legal del Estado, http://www.
defensalegal.gob.boindex.php?option=com-content&view=article&id=4&Item
id=6 (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
202. Id.
203. Veronica Maseda, Indirect Expropriation, http://www.iisd.org/investment/capacity/
dciforum_2008.asp (last visited Sept. 22, 2010).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See Christoph Schreuer, supra note 192.
207. Juan Banderas, Acuerdo Latinoamericano de Promocion y Proteccion de Inver-
siones: Una Propuesta Intregradora [Latin American Agreement on Investment
Promotion and Protection: A Proposal], http://www.metabase.net/docs/procomer/
06441.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2010).
208. See id.
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projects such as a supranational Model BIT, states need the support of a
regional organization that enables them to carry out this type of joint
initiatives.
In this sense, we must take into account the existence of the
"Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas" (ALBA). 209 This regional or-
ganization, currently consisting of nine countries, presents itself as a
scheme of integration based on principles of cooperation, solidarity and
complementariness. 210 ALBA looks to overcome the obstacles that pre-
vent true integration, such as poverty, aiming to compensate for the ex-
isting asymmetries between its members. 211 Following upon a proposal
of Hugo Chavez in 2001, ALBA has promoted some initiatives in the
field of international investment, like the creation of a regional petroleum
company called Petroamdrica or the establishment of a Society of Latin
American Reciprocal Guarantees to reduce the dependency on foreign
investment. 212
In the area of international dispute resolution, the seventh ALBA sum-
mit of 2009 proposed the creation of a regional center to replace ICSID
arbitration, instructing a dispute resolution group to work on this issue.213
This working group has made the objectives underlying the creation of
this regional body public by setting up a dispute settlement mechanism
that is fair, equitable, impartial and able to understand the social, eco-
nomic and political realities of the peoples of Latin America. This entity
would achieve a breakthrough in the consolidation of ALBA, the region
would also shield itself legally and socially and Latin America could dis-
pense with international entities, such as ICSID, that ignore the primacy
of public interest over private interest. 214
Together with this proposal by ALBA, similar initiatives are being de-
veloped in Latin America. For some time, the region wanted to have an
organization that encompasses all of the states in South America. Thus,
in May 2008, the "Constitutive Treaty of the Union of South American
Nations" (UNASUR) was created for the purpose of merging the An-
dean Community, MERCOSUR and Chile, together with Guyana and
209. See Shannon D. Williams, The Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas: Rethinking
Economic Integration After the Failures of Neoliberalism, 2009 (Master's Thesis,
University of Tennessee), available at http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk-gradthes/82.
210. See id.
211. Id.
212. Michael Fox, Defining the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas-
ALBA,Venezuela Analysis, Aug. 4, 2006, http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/
1870.
213. Fernando Cabrera Diaz, Alba Forward With Plan to Create Regional Investment




214. En la Procuraduria General de la Republica, Representantes Del Alba-TPC
Trabajaron Sobre la Instancia de Resolucion de Controversias [In the Attorney
General of the Republic, Representatives of the Alba-TPC Instance Worked on the
Resolution of Disputes], Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela http://
www.pgr.gob.ve/biblioteca.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2010).
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Suriname. 215 In June 2009, at the thirty-ninth Session of the General As-
sembly of the Organization of American States, Ecuador's Foreign Minis-
ter Fander Falconi proposed that UNASUR create an arbitration center,
which would allow Latin America to free itself from any foreign tute-
lage.2 16 During his term as temporary president of UNASUR, Rafael
Correa has endeavored to promote this project that limits dispute resolu-
tion proceedings to regional forums.217 On June 25th, 2009, President
Correa declared at the U.N., "if a system has failed, we cannot expect a
solution from those who created that system. Instead, we have to look to
others like our own people." 218 Therefore, UNASUR shares the objec-
tives of ALBA on resolution of disputes arising from international invest-
ment and advocates the creation of conciliation and arbitration tribunals.
They should be composed of jurists of each country in the region 219 and
deal with "the leniency [for] transnational capital [that] has [been] able to
exercise [greater] rights than people." 220 From a sectorial perspective, in
April 2007, the first South American Energy Summit took place. 221 It
established the South American Energy Council and set out to create an
Energy Security Treaty, which would establish, among other things, an
entity to resolve energy disputes in the region.222
215. Jackson Bennett, The Union of South American Nations: The New(est) Regional-
ism in Latin America, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'i L. R. 103, 123-24 (2008); see also
Union of South American Nations [UNASAR], http://www.comunidadandina.org/
ingles/sudamerican.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2010).
216. Ecuador Propondra un Nuevo Sistema de Arbitraje Durante su Presidencia en la
Unasur [Ecuador Will Propose a New System of Arbitration During its Presidency
of UNASUR], hoy.com, July 8, 2009, http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias-ecuador/ec-
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357247.html.
217. Ecuador Agita Foros Internacionales [Ecuador Stirred International Forums], In-
ternational Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Aug. 5, 2009, http://
ictsd.org/i/news/puentes/52300/.
218. Melissa Draper, President Correa speaks at U.N. event 'Peoples Rights not Corpo-
rate Profits', NJ Gl, July 8, 2009, http://justinvestment.orgl2009107/president-correa-
speaks-at-u-n-event-%e2%80%98peoples-rights-not-corporate-profits%e2%80%
99-by-melissa-draper.
219. Interview by Juan Francisco Alonso with Luisa Estella Morales, President, Su-
preme Tribunal of Justice of Venezuela, For the TSJ, All Cases Are Relevant, We
do Not Discriminate (Oct. 16, 2008), available at http://www.eluniversal.com/2008/
10/16/en-pol-esp.for-the-tsj,-all-ca_16A2073343.shtml.
220. Intervencion del Canciller ecuatoriano, Dr. Fander Falconi, en la sesion de la OEA
de 2 de junio de 2009 [Intervention of the Ecuadorian Chancellor, Dr. Fander Fal-
coni, at the session of the OAS, June 2, 2009], www.scm.oas.org/idms-public/
SPANISHIHist 09/acOl 392t04.doc.
221. Carlos Malamud, La Cumbre Energetica de America Del Sur y la Intergracion Re-
gional: un Camino de Buenas (y no Tan Buenas) Intenciones [Energy Summit of
South America and Regional Integration Division: A Path of Good (and Not So
Good) Intentions], Informe Uruguay, http://www.uruguayinforme.com/news/
27072007/27072007_carlos-malamud.php (last visited Sept. 22, 2010).
222. Fernando Cabrera Diaz, South American Alternative to ICSID in the Works as
Governments Create an Energy Treaty, Inv. Treaty News, Aug. 6, 2008, http://
www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2008/08/06/south-american-alter-
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A few months ago, leaders of more than thirty Latin American states
have announced that they will create a new regional bloc, including every
country in the Americas except for the United States and Canada. It is
debatable that this proposal, presented at the Rio Group Summit in Mex-
ico in late February 2010, aims to reduce the power of the Organization
of American States, to which the United States and Canada belong.223
111. CONCLUSION
As it has been pointed out throughout this paper, Latin America 2 2 4 is
currently going back to approaches that belong to the Calvo doctrine. 225
This stance is considered to be beneficial by these countries, as the Calvo
doctrine fosters the region's independence from the United States and
strengthens Latin American sovereignty and regionalism. Nevertheless,
it must be taken into account that Latin America is not a harmonious
bloc. 2 2 6 This is demonstrated through a number of factors, including its
Ministers Agree that Unasur will resolve Disputes], Nacionales, May 9, 2008, http:/
/elobservador.rctv.net/Noticias/VerNoticia.aspx?Noticiald=236731&Tipo=14.
223. Rio Group Agrees to Form New Regional Bloc With Exception of Canada, U.S.,
CCTV, Feb. 24, 2010, http://english.cctv.com/program/newshour/20100224/
103900.shtml.; Michael Toiba, Rio Group Pitches New Latin American Body,
Americas Society, Feb. 23, 2010, http://www.as-coa.org/article.php?id=2178.
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the respondent was the U.S. government. From the defendant's perspective, a re-
cent example of how the United States is supporting the reduction of the protec-
tion-level granted to foreign investors is the case Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United
States of America. The arbitral tribunal held that: "to violate the customary inter-
national law minimum standard of treatment codified in Article 1105 of the
NAFTA, an act must be sufficiently egregious and shocking-a gross denial of
justice, manifest arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due process,
evident discrimination, or a manifest lack of reasons-so as to fall below accepted
international standards and constitute a breach of Article 1105(1)." Glamis Gold,
Ltd. v. United States, ICSID (W. Bank) 10 (2009), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/
documents/GlamisAward.pdf. Furthermore, in the process of reform of the U.S.
Model BIT which started in 2009, one of the crucial issues for discussion is whether
foreign investors in the United States can enjoy a better legal status than domestic
entrepreneurs. Press Release, United States Department of Justice, Public Meet-
ing Regarding the Public Meeting Regarding the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty Review (July 22, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/
july/126304.htm; U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Review (July. 22, 2009),
available at http://www.state.gov/r/palprs/ps/2009/july/126304.htm.
225. Santiago Montt, What International Investment Law and Latin America Can and
Should Demand from Each Other. Updating the Bello/CalvoDoctrine in the BIT
Generation, Paper presented at the Global Administrative Law Buenos Aires
Workshop, Oct. 16-17, 2009, available at http://www.iilj.org/GAL/documents/San-
tiagoMontt.GAL.pdf; Wenhua Shan, From "North-South Divide" to "Private-Pub-
tic Debate": Revival of the Calvo Doctrine and the Changing Landscape in
International Investment Law, 27 Nw. J. INT-'L L. & Bus. 631, 649-651 (2007); Jose
C. Fernandez Rozas, America Latina y el Arbitraje de Inversiones: Matrimonio de
Amor o Matrimonio de Conveniencia? [America and the Arbitration Investment:
Marriage of Love or Marriage of Convenience?], 24 Ri-VISTA DE LA CORTE ESPA-
NOLA DE, ARBITRAJE [Journal of Spanish Court of Arbitration] 13, 34 (2009).
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level of development, its political allies and its economic policies. 227
While some countries of Latin America continue to develop liberal eco-
nomic policies (Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, and Colombia),
others (Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador) have shown their reluctance to
conform to this model, and are adopting a different model of economic
regulation. 228 The first set of neo-liberal proposals is based on free mar-
ket access, institutional efficiency, and investor protection, while, on the
other hand, the anti-Free Trade Agreement countries rely on a strong
state, capable of creating wealth through its control over natural re-
sources and the economy. 2 2 9 A clear example of the important differ-
ences that exist within this region are the many recent clashes between
Hugo Chavez and Alvaro Uribe, president of Venezuela and former pres-
ident of Colombia, respectively.230 Both leaders represent the various
tendencies that coexist, and sometimes collide, within Latin America.
Similar conclusions can be drawn if we analyze the specific sector of
investment arbitration in Latin America. On the one hand, this paper has
shown that in recent years there have been many conflicts in this field.
Due to a wide number of cited reasons, the system established by ICSID
has been considered detrimental by the countries of Latin America. On
the other hand, despite this general anti-ICSID sentiment in Latin
America, each nation is developing its own position according to its
socio-political characteristics.
The countries examined most thoroughly in this paper are: Argentina,
Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia. Argentina's resistance to ICSID is a
result of a series of ICSID awards issued against the country as a conse-
quence of an economic crisis that Argentina has considered to be a state
of necessity.231 On the other hand, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia have
leftist regimes, which can be considered politically volatile232 by powers
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See Stephen M. Siptroth, Welcoming All to a Table of Plenty: The Free Trade Area
and the Bolivarian Alternative as Competing Means for Economic Integration in the
Americas, 12 UCLA J. INT'i- L. & FOREIGN AF. 359, 388-90 (2007); see generally
Mauricio Baquero Herrera, Latin American Update: Something is Going on in
Latin America, 12 LAW & Bus. Riv. AM. 613 (2006).
230. Chdvez-Uribe Clash at the Unity Summit in Cancun, Ei. UNIVERSAl., Feb. 26, 2010,
http://archivo.eluniversal.com/2010/02/26/en-ing-esp-chavez,-uribe-
clash_26A3495731.shtml; Might Chdvez-Uribe Fight Kickstart Solutions?, Stabroek
News, Feb. 28, 2010, http://www.stabroeknews.com/2010/features/02/28/might-cha-
vez-uribe-fight-kickstart-solutions; Chavez Breaks Off Relations With Colombia,
Tension Increases Along Border, AOL Noticias [AOL News], July 22, 2010, http://
noticias.aol.com/2010/07/22/chavez-breaks-off-relations-with-colombia/.
231. Arbitraje de inversiones (CIADI y UNCITRAL). Novedades en los casos de Ar-
gentina [Arbitration Investment Disputes (ICSID and UNCITRA L). Developments
in the cases of Argentina], DIPr Argentina, June 16, 2008, http://www.diprargen-
tina.com/2008/06/arbitraje-de-inversiones-ciadi-y.html (analyzing Argentina's de-
fenses in these cases).
232. In relation to this volatility, consider for example the recent failed coup in Ecua-
dor. Simon Romero, Ecuador's Police Chief Resigns After Uprising, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 2, 2010, at A6.
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like the United States.233 The control of valuable natural resources has
become a national issue in these countries. 234 From their perspective, the
exploitation of these resources by foreign companies shows the abuse
committed by the first world in Latin America.
As a part of their "retaliation campaign", Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bo-
livia are developing a series of initiatives aimed at eliminating ICSID as a
forum for resolving international investment disputes. 235 This paper has
analyzed in detail these initiatives and their legal implications including
the following: (1) resorting to the Constitution to ignore ICSID awards,
(2) promoting national courts' reactions against ICSID, (3) drafting inter-
national contracts that avoid ICSID arbitration, (4) withdrawing from the
ICSID Convention, (5) using Bilateral Investment Treaties to combat IC-
SID, (6) creating national agencies to react against ICSID arbitrations,
and (7) developing a regional arbitration center aimed at replacing
ICSID.
Within this more reactionary bloc, there are also differences in the in-
tensity of the nations' responses and there is some precedent for interna-
tional investment disputes between South American countries that,
theoretically, share approaches. 236 At this time, the most radical position
is that taken by Venezuela.237 In recent months, President Chavez expro-
priated several foreign companies operating in key sectors of the coun-
try,2 3 8 "and created a joint venture with Russia to drill for heavy crude oil
in Venezuela's Orinoco River Basin." 239 Chavez also announced his in-
tention to withdraw Venezuela from the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights after this organization accused him of endangering democ-
racy in Venezuela. 240 This kind of news certainly worries the interna-
233. Eric Toussaint, Characteristics of the Experiences Underway in Equador, Vene-
zuela, and Bolivia, Iwr'L VmFWPOINT, July 2008, http://www.internationalviewpoint.
org/spip.php?articlel502.
234. Id.
235. Emmanuel Gaillard, Anti-Arbitration Trends in Latin America, 239 N.Y.L.J. 1-2,
(2008).
236. In 2007, Brazil's president demanded a hefty compensation from his Bolivian
counterpart, as a consequence of the nationalization of two Petrobras refineries in
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Dispels Doubts About His "Allies" Chavez and Evo Morales], La Naci6n, Apr. 26,
2007, available at http://www.oceba.gba.gov.ar/prensa//modules.php?name=News&
file=article&sid=1 1806.
237. In Ecuador, however, the international political and economic press considers that,
during his second presidential term, Correa will deploy a more radical rhetoric, but
his policies will be more moderate and are going to try to approach the United
States. Christian Volkel, President Promises Swift Changes in Equador Ahead of
Inaugural Ceremony, Global Insight, Aug. 2009, www.ihsglobalinsight.com.
238. Posting of Simon Lester to Int'l Economic L. & Pol'y Blog, A Peaceful Expropria-
tion, http://worldtradelaw.type.pad.com/ielpblog/2010/02/a-peaceful-expropria-
tion.himi (Feb. 19, 2010, 14:05).
239. Venezuela, Russia in Joint Crude-Oil Venture, Radio Free Eur. Radio Liberty,
Apr. 1, 2010, http://www.rferl.org/content/VenezuelaRussia_In JointCrudeOil
Venture/ 999536.html
240. Rory Carroll, Chavez Furious as OAS Rights Watchdog Accuses Him of Endanger-
ing Democracy, Guardian, Feb. 26, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/
feb/25/oas-report-chavez-human-rights.
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tional community and investors, particularly those in the United States
and Europe.
Additionally, the possible negative effects of reviving some aspects of
the Calvo doctrine should not be ignored. The leaders of these Latin
American countries are introducing abrupt changes in legislation, making
their legal systems unstable. Foreign investors reject this lack of clarity
because, from their perspective, it raises their investment's risks. Other
actions of these Latin American governments, such as unilateral modifi-
cation or forced renegotiation of oil contracts with foreign companies as
well as the elimination of the ICSID reference in new BITs, lead to the
same conclusion: the loss of security will possibly decrease foreign direct
investment in Latin America in the coming years. Currently, production
and trade are global phenomena. If Latin America becomes a difficult
region for investors, they will go to other developing countries located in
Asia or Africa that are eager to attract foreign investments.
Furthermore, the consolidation of this anti-ICSID policy generates fear
from the perspective of social development in the region. There are his-
torical precedents in Latin America showing that the reduction of foreign
investments in the region has negative effects on the welfare of the gen-
eral population.24 1 Many of these countries have alarming rates of pov-
erty, unemployment, life expectancy, and illiteracy. Assuming that direct
foreign investments generate revenues in the host states242 and that it is
appropriately used to support the development of the country,2 4 3 the loss
of this financial support would make Latin American countries fall under
desirable international standards of development. 244
To avoid this undesirable situation, Latin American political leaders
must be able to foresee the potential costs of their actions and act with
historical responsibility. Populist measures can ingratiate the ruling polit-
ical party with the electorate and facilitate these leaders' re-election. But
if these kinds of measures are not beneficial globally, in the medium-to-
long term, their personal interests will harm the community. Recently,
different sectors have been demanding that investment arbitration take
into account the collective interests that are involved in such interna-
tional operations. If the arbitration system represented by ICSID is
heavily criticized by some Latin America countries, the introduction of a
new and more balanced system of international investment must be espe-
241. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Comm'n for Asia & the Pacific (ESCAP), Interregional
Cooperation in Trade & Investment, 184-85, U.N. Doc. ST/ESCAP/2069, http://
www.unescap.org/tid/publication/chap5_.2069.pdf.
242. This issue is still being discussed by scholars. See generally Jason W. Yackee, Do
Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from
Alternative Evidence, University of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research, Paper No.
1114 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
1594887.
243. See generally Gus van Harten, Five Justifications for Investment Treaties: A Critical
Discussion, 2 TRADE L. & Div. 1, 45 (2010).
244. Miguel D. Ramirez, Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico During the 1990s: An
Empirical Assessment, 28 E. ECON. J. 409, 411-12 n.3 (2002).
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cially careful in protecting the future welfare of developing countries.
Only if this requirement is met will it be possible to say that the advan-
tages of a "new order" outweigh any disadvantages.
Therefore, recent proposals made from the "first world" to improve the
current system -such as the elaboration of a Multilateral Agreement on
Foreign Investment 245 or a Restatement of International Investment
Law2 4 6 Will probably be rejected by Latin Americans, since they assume
that these proposals will, like previous ones, be opposed to their interests.
On the other hand, more development-oriented proposals, such as "the
creation of an Advisory Center for International Investment Law to pro-
vide a range of services to under resourced developing countries," the
foundation of a permanent roster of arbitrators in which developing
countries would be prominently represented, and/or greater intervention
from the Inter-American Development Bank may be interesting to the
Latin American states, but it is unlikely that they will be considered suffi-
cient by all Latin American countries. 2 4 7
Upon analyzing Latin America's past, it seems that its relationship with
foreign investments is tilting and a phase of market opening is being fol-
lowed by abrupt nationalization measures and vice versa. It would be
good if Latin America finds a more measured and steady approach.
Latin American countries have to make a serious effort to first assume
that if they want to improve their rates of development, they have to let
foreign companies invest and develop their business in their territory. On
the other hand, they should be aware that there are certain types of in-
vestments that can harm their countries such as investments, which are
detrimental to the citizens' health as well as the environment and may
deplete nonrenewable resources. Therefore, Latin American countries
have to work intensively to develop a set of tools, including legal ones,
which would ultimately allow them to refuse unwanted investments.
Thus, it is essential that the international investment laws be recon-
structed in order to take into account the wishes and needs of the host
states.
To achieve this goal, Latin America could implement measures such as
the creation of a regional center for the settlement of international invest-
ment disputes. This possible organization, located in Latin America and
built on more favorable principles for developing countries, would be
able to oppose ICSID's influence in the region, especially if there are
many countries that are politically, economically, and legally involved in
this project, and if they are determined to develop a common strategy.
245. Efraim Chalamish, The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A de Facto Multi-
lateral Agreement, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 303, 334 (2009).
246. Asha Kaushal, Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash
Against the Foreign Investment Regime, 50 HARV. Ir'L L. J. 491, 495 (2009).
247. Memorandum from author to Office of the President, Improving the International
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An essential aspect of this future arbitral court is that it must be able to
help these developing States to free themselves from a "trap of low-qual-
ity institutions." 2 4 8 The legal status of some Latin American institutions
has been criticized from the outside and it is a fact that the dispute settle-
ment bodies of MERCOSUR and the Andean Community have not been
successful. 249 Therefore, a new organization that serves as a genuine al-
ternative to ICSID must meet a number of difficult requirements in order
to be universally considered superior to its predecessor. This new organi-
zation should, for example, establish a fast, economical, and transparent
system. Moreover, these features should not be incompatible with the
possibility of offering an appeal to the losing party. It can't be forgotten
that member states of this regional entity must perform a Herculean task:
generally withdraw from ICSID, denounce their BITS referring to IC-
SID, and refer to this new arbitral court in their BITs, international con-
tracts, or even constitutions.250 Therefore, time will tell if the proposals
outlined above will eventually become a Latin American entity, capable
of providing answers that satisfy both parties to an international invest-
ment dispute.
In the future, together with this renewed system of international invest-
ment arbitration, it would be very beneficial to increase the use of ADR
mechanisms such as mediation, conciliation, or negotiation. If they are
used from the beginning of the investment project, they will reduce the
number of conflicts requiring arbitration, and thus also avoid the imple-
mentation of expropriatory measures that are in vogue today in some
Latin American countries. 251 If Latin American states decide in the fu-
ture to cede their sovereignty to a regional arbitration center, which is
able to replace and improve the ICSID system, the same institutional
structure would also be able to accommodate wider purposes, advanta-
geous for the region. For this proposal to succeed, it will be necessary for
these measures to be applied by ADR neutral entities which are immune
from political influences and which maintain their independence and sta-
bility, regardless of political changes that may occur in different countries
in the region.
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